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Abstract 
Satellite capabilities greatly enhance both the military and civilian sectors of 
society. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons pose a serious risk to aIl satellites. Chapter One 
of this thesis discusses current satellite capabilities. Chapter Two, details the wide 
variety of ASA T weapons. Chapter Three turns to the intentions of various States to 
employ ASATs. Chapter Four analyzes the legal implications ofusing force against 
satellites-beginning with the laws relating to the use of force in general, inc1uding the 
right of self-defense, and then progressing through relevant provisions of the laws of 
armed conflict. It also addresses the debate over the militarization and weaponization of 
outer space and past efforts at non-proliferation that relate to space activities. Chapter 
Five addresses the creation of space debris-a side effect of ASAT use. l will conc1ude 
with a short discussion regarding the potential for a new international agreement 
restricting the use of ASATs. 
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Résumé 
Les possibilités satellites augmentent considérablement les secteurs militaires et 
civils de la société. Les armes (ASAT) antisatellite posent un risque sérieux à tous les 
satellites. Le chapitre un de cette thèse discute des possibilités satellites courantes. 
Chapitre deux, détails la large-variété d'armes d'ASAT. Le chapitre trois explique les 
intentions de divers états d'utiliser ASATs. Le chapitre quatre analyse les implications 
légales d'employer la force contre les satellite en commençant par les lois concernant 
l'utilisation de la force généralement comprenant les droits de l'autodéfense, progressant 
alors par les dispositions appropriées des lois du conflit armé. Il adresse également la 
discussion au-dessus de la militarisation et de l'armement de l'espace extra 
atmosphérique et après les efforts à la non-prolifération qui se relient aux activités de 
l'espace. Chapitre cinq relate la création de l'effet secondaire de débris d'espace en 
l'utilisant les ASAT. Je conclurai avec une discussion courte concernant le potentiel pour 
un nouvel accord international limitant l'utilisation d'ASATs. 
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Introduction 
Orbiting the Earth at 17,000 miles per hour, l five hundred and thirty seven miles 
straight up, the Chinese weather satellite, Feng-Yun-1C (translated, "wind and cloud") 
exploded into thousands ofpieces. On Il January 2007, the Chine se launched a solid-
fuel, medium-ranged missile at their own satellite? Dubbed SC-19 by US. military 
intelligence, the missile was launched from a mobile missile launcher on the Songlin 
pad.3 The Chinese tested this anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) on two prior occasions,4 this 
time, however, they demonstrated they possessed the ability to destroy a satellite in Low 
Earth Orbit-becoming only the third State, after the V.S. and Russia, to possess this 
capability. 
Besides showing the world it could intentionally target and destroy a satellite, 
China increased the risk of unintentional destruction to other satellites. Prior to impact, 
Feng-Yun 1C weighed about 750 kg and measured 4.6 feet on each side, with solar 
panels that extended about 28 feet. 5 After collision, the former Feng-Yun 1C was 
shattered into about 2 million pieces of debris measuring between 1 mm and 1 cm, an 
additiona140,000 pieces ofdebris measuringbetween 1 cm and 10 cm and another 800-
l "An earth satellite in a low circular orbit, around 100 miles up, goes about 17,000 miles an hour." 
Thomas Karas, The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons ofSpace Age War (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 1983) at 15l. 
2 Michael R. Gordon & David S. Cloud, "US. knew ofChina's missile test, but kept silent" International 
Herald Tribune (23 April 2007), online: International Herald Tribune , 
<http://www.iht.comlarticles/2007/04/23/asia/23missile.php> (accessed 6 July 2007). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Both prior tests (7 July 2005 and 6 February 2006) missed their targets. Ibid. 
5 Isenberg, David. "The Newest Anti-Satellite Contender: China's ASAT Test" (British American Security 
Information Council, Occasional Papers on Int'l Security Policy, 16 March 2007) at 3, online: British 
American Security Information Council <http://www.basicint.orgipubs/NotesIBN070316.pdf.> (accessed 
29 May 2007). 
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1,000 pieces of debris measuring over 10 cm.6 All ofthis debris, orbiting at speeds up to 
29,400 miles per hour-up to 17 times the speed of a bullet fired from a machine gun 7_ 
and a large part of this debris will remain in orbit for decades.8 The debris created by this 
test increased the risk of collision with 300 satellites belonging to 24 different States and 
one intergovernmental organization.9 
This thesis will address the wide range of legal issues sUITounding ASAT use. In 
Chapter One, l will address the variety of CUITent satellite capabilities and uses-
demonstrating the tremendous importance of satellites to States. l will divide satellites 
into the broad categories of communications satellites, reconnaissance and remote-
sensing satellites, navigation satellites, meteorological (weather) satellites, research 
satellites and manned space missions. l also address both the military and civilian uses of 
each of these categories of satellites. 
Chapter Two will address past, present and future ASA T weapons. These 
weapons will be discussed, not in chronological order, nor by the State that possesses the 
discussed ASAT, but rather by the type of ASAT system-nuclear, kinetic energy 
(explosive), laser and other directed energy weapons, electronic jamming and finally, the 
inherent capabilities a ballistic missile defense system possesses for use as an ASA T. l 
6 David Wright, "Debris from China's Kinetic Energy ASAT Test" (May 1007), online: Union of 
Concemed Scientists <http://www. ucsusa.org/ global_ security/ space _ weapons/ debris-from -chinas-asat-
test.html> (accessed 2 July 2007). 
7 "Space Debris Spotlight" (29 August 2006), online: European Space Agency 
<http://www.esa.intiesaCP/SEMHDJXJDIE]eatureWeek_O.html> (accessed 29 May 2007). 
8 Wright, supra note 6. 
9 Union of Concemed Scientists, "Dossier: Satellites Under Threat", online: (2007) 1: 1 
MilSatMagazine.com at 5 <http://www.milsatmagazine.com/2007/milsatmagazine_ql.pdf> (accessed 9 
July 2007). 
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will then tie Chapters One and Two together by addressing the vulnerability of satellites 
posed by the various ASAT systems. 
Chapter Three will analyze a variety of indications that the United States, China 
and Russia intend to use ASATs. The focus will be on the United States-Iargely 
because it is the most transparent of the States with the ability to launch an ASAT 
weapon, and hence the majority of available information on the subject deals with U.S. 
programs. This thesis will delve into U.S. military doctrine, the recent and prior U.S. 
national space policies and other indications from Congress and U.S. Presidents of the 
intention to use ASAT weapons. Sorne analysis will then be given to indications that 
both China and Russia intend to use ASATs-including the most obvious of aIl-China' s 
Il January 2007 ASAT test. This chapter will also address the potential for terrorist 
organizations to employ ASAT weapons. 
Chapter Four, will probe the military uses of space. Beginning with the Charter 
of the United Nations, l will address its ban on both the use of force and the threat of 
using force, and the controversially-applied exception for self-defense. l will address the 
applicability of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to activities in space, including 
issues of targeting civilian satellites or incidentally damaging satellites owned by States 
not involved in a conflict (neutral States). From there l will discuss the "peaceful" use of 
space (and the debate over what that means-"non-aggressive" or "non-military"). 
Finally, l will address international non-proliferation treaties and how they relate to 
ASATs (i.e., the Limited Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuc/ear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). 
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Chapter Five will turn to a problematic consequence of ASAT use-space debris. 
l will discuss State liability for damage caused by debris in both space and on Earth. l 
will aiso address the requirement that States give "due regard" to the outer space 
activities of other States and the requirement to enter into "appropriate international 
consultations" prior to intentionally creating debris in space. Finally, l will address the 
impact of the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) on ASAT use. 
Chapter Six will address the desirability of a treaty restricting ASATs and the 
prospects for such a treaty. l will conclude with a few conclusions and recommendations. 
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Chapter One: Varions Uses of Satellites 
Before launching into an analysis of ASAT capabilities and the legal implications 
that accompany their use, it is important to first turn to the current uses of satellites, the 
many objects orbiting the Earth. lo Without addressing "what's up there," analyzing their 
premature destruction would have little meaning. 
The first man-made satellite to orbit the Earth was Sputnik 1, launched by the 
USSR on 4 October 1957.11 It had no purpose other than to show its own existence in 
Earth' s orbit via a small radio transmitter. 12 Since that time, there have been over 4,700 
space launches. 13 Approximately 3,000 satellites have been launched into space. 14 Of 
the 192 States that are members of the United Nations, 15 only eight have succe~sfully 
launched their own satellite. 16 Another 33 States own satellites that were launched into 
10 A satellite is merely a "celestial object which orbits a larger one." The New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, 5th ed., s. v. "satellite". Interestingly, the word cornes from the Latin word "satellitis" meaning 
"bodyguard." Michel Bourbonnière, "Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites 
or lus in Bello Satellitis" (2004) 9: 1 J. Confl. & Sec. L. 43 at 43. 
11 Clayton K.S. Chun, Defending Space: US Anti-Satellite Warfare and Space Weaponry (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2006) at 7 [Chun, Defending Space]. 
12 Berndt Feuerbacher, "Space Utilization" in Berndt Feuerbacher & Heinz Stoewer, eds., Utilization of 
Space: Today and Tomorrow (Heidelberg: Springer, 2006) 3 at 8. The USSR described the purpose of 
Sputnik 1 as "physical study of the atmosphere" when it registered Sputnik 1 with the United Nations. UN 
Doc. AlAC.105/INF.002 (1962). 
\3 Tamar A. Mehuron, "2006 Space Almanac: The US military space operation in facts and figures" Air 
Force Magazine (August 2006) 68, 76 [Mehuron, "Space Almanac"]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 "United Nations Member States" onlihe: United Nations <http://www.un.orglmembers/list.shtml> 
(accessed 9 July 2007). 
16 States capable oflaunching their own satellites into orbit include: the United States, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, France, Japan, Israel, India and China. Heinz Stoewer, "Access to Space-the Prerequisites for 
Space Utilization" in Feuerbacher & Stoewer, supra note 12, 23 at 24-26. 
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space by one ofthe eight States capable oflaunching satellites. 17 Of approximately 3,000 
satellites that have been launched, about 847 are still operationa1. 18 
Determining an accurate number of active satellites is difficult. There are a few 
reasons for this difficulty. First, though the United Nations maintains a registry of space 
objects,19 and though"space objects" is a broad term that encompasses aIl man-made 
satellites and parts thereof,20 not aIl satellites are registered. Only 45 States have ratified 
the Registration Convention and another four have signed it, so the majority of States are 
not even bound to register their space objects.21 Of the States that currently possess 
17 Aigeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, 
Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. UCS Satellite Database (9 April 2007), online: Union of 
Concemed Scientists <www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/satellite _ database.html> (accessed 
9 July 2007). 
18 Data was taken from the 9 April 2007 satellite database prepared by the Union of Concemed Scientists. 
This spreadsheet is updated approximately every quarter from a variety of unclassified sources and is 
available at no charge at www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/satellite_database.html. There is 
a wide discrepancy between different sources as to the numbers of satellites. For example, the Space 
Security Index of2006, published by McGill University's Institute of Air and Space Law, only reported 
"more than 620 operational satellites" in 2006. "Space Security Index 2006" (2007) XXXII Ann. Air & 
Sp. L. 201, at 207 ["Space Security Index 2006"]. The Teal Group completed a survey in 2001, identifying 
between 600-610 satellites. "Teal Survey Counts 600-610 Active Satellites Currently in Orbit" (2 October 
2001) online: SpaceRef.com <http://www.spaceref.comlnews/viewpr.htm1?pid=6l75> (accessed 6 Ju1y 
2007). In contrast, a command spokesperson for USAF Space Command recently noted that there were 
roughly 700 active satellites that would, during part oftheir orbits, cross into Low Earth Orbit. "Chine se 
Missile Test Se en as US Threat" Taranaki Daily News (13 April 2007) 10. Given the widely conflicting 
estimates on active satellites, any compilation of numbers and statistics in this regard has been difficult. 
For the sake of consistency throughout this thesis, 1 have used the database maintained by the Union of 
Concemed Scientists, a free and seemingly comprehensive database on an easily searchable Excel 
spreadsheet. 
19 Pursuant to Article IV of the Convention on the Registration ofObjects Launched into Outer Space, 14 
January 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15,28 U.S.T. 695 [Registration Convention], each State that launches a space 
object into Earth orbit or beyond must "as soon as practicable" fumish basic information about that space 
object to the United Nations, including the name of the satellite, the date and location of the launch, and the 
"general function of the space object." 
20 "The term 'space object' includes component parts ofa space object as well as its launch vehic1e and 
parts thereof." Ibid., art. I(c). 
21 "Convention on Registration ofObjects Launched into Outer Space," online: United Nations 
<http://www.unoosa.org/oosaleniSORegister/regist.html> (accessed 9 July 2007). 
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active satellites, twelve have neither ratified nor signed the Registration Convention,z2 
Second, military satellites may be "classified" by their governments, and though 
astronomers may notice them, they may never be registered.23 Finally, the number of 
"active" satellites is always changing-new satellites are being launched and older 
satellites either fall back to the Earth or just run out of fuel and bec orne useless. AlI of 
these considerations help explain the wide discrepancy in reported "active satellites." 
Satellites can be grouped broadly by function into six categories: (1) 
communications; (2) navigation; (3) remote-sensing and surveillance; (4) weather; (5) 
research satellites (both earth science and astronomy); and (6) manned space missions. 
The percentage of satellites engaged in the various uses is as follows: 24 
Communications Satellites 
Remote-Sensing / Surveillance 
Navigation Satellites 
Weather Satellites 
Other Scientific Satellites 
63% 
14% 
7% 
5% 
11% 
Satellites orbit the Earth at various altitudes and angles, their orbits largely 
dependent on their intended purpose. The most commonly used orbits and sorne of the 
most prominent satellite uses for each orbit are as follows: 
22 Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and Thailand. "Status ofIntemational Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space," 
ontine: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
<http://www.unoosa.orgloosa/enlSpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html> (accessed 9 July 2007). 
23 States that are Parties to the Registration Convention only need to provide information regarding their 
satellites for the United Nations Registry "as soon as practicable". Registration Convention, supra note 19, 
art. IV(l). It may not be "practicable" for aState to share this information for a classified military satellite. 
24 ues Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
7 
This is, of course, highly simplified. There are communications satellites in aIl of 
the above orbits, just as there are surveillance satellites in Medium Earth Orbit and 
Geostationary Earth Orbit and weather satellites in Geostationary Earth Orbit. The chart 
is merely intended to give a general understanding of where satellites are commonly 
located. It only makes sense, that if aState wants a close look at the Earth, say for 
surveillance or weather monitoring, it would place its satellites in Low Earth Orbit. 
Likewise, for a broader view of the Earth, say, for increased line-of-sight for 
communications, a satellite in Geostationary Earth Orbit would be more suitable. 
A. Communications Satellites 
About 63 percent of aIl operational satellites are communications satellites (536 
of 847).25 Satellites are naturally suited for long-distance communications. They are, 
essentially, very tall relay stations for receiving and re-transmitting radio signals?6 They 
are arguably superior to relay stations located on Earth in terms ofboth capability and 
cost. For example, it only takes three satellites, properly spaced in the Geostationary 
25 ues Satellite Database, supra note 17. The Satellite Database maintained by Analytical Graphies, Inc. 
also listed 536 active communications satellites in 2006. The Space Report: The Guide ta Global Space 
Activity (Colorado Springs: Space Foundation, 2006) at 37 [Space Report]. 
26 Nicolas Mateesco Matte, ed., Space Activities and Emerging International Law (Montreal: McGill 
University, 1984) at 22. 
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Earth Orbit,27 at 22,300 miles (35,780 kilometers) above the equator to broadcast a signal 
over the entire Earth.28 Each satellite in Geostationary Earth Orbit has a continuous and 
unobstructed view ofapproximately 40 percent of the surface of the Earth. No tower 
built on the Earth can compete with that unobstructed view. In fact, "[0 ]ne repeater on a 
[Geostationary Earth Orbit] satellite can effectively do the work ofthousands ofrepeaters 
on the ground.,,29 
Additionally, satellites are capable of providing communications in spite of 
oceans or mountains-especially useful for ships and planes.3o Using satellites for 
communications can permit aState to avoid building a tremendous amount of 
infrastructure. In many regions of the world, satellites could provide communications to 
rural are as that currently have limited communication capabilities. In fact, satellite 
communications are the only way possible to provide an instant connection for 
"approximately three-quarters of the Earth's surface (oceans, deserts, rain forests, 
mountain ranges, swamps, and bogS)';.31 
Communications satellites include satellites providing telephone services, data 
transmission, broadband Internet, and television and radio broadcasting. 
Communications satellites broadcast over 10,000 television channels to audiences lOto 
27 "[T]he geostationary orbit is the orbit, a satellite placed in which revolves around the Earth with the same 
speed as of the rotation of the Earth and thus appears to remain stationary over a given point on the surface 
of the Earth." Ram S. Jakhu, "The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit" (1982) 7 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 
333, at 333, n. 1. 
28 Edward Ashford, "Communications" in Feuerbacher & Stoewer, supra note 12,227 at 229. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Matte, supra note 26 at 22. 
31 Joseph N. Pelton, "Overview of Satellite Communications" in Takashi Iida, Joseph N. Pelton, & Edward 
Ashford, eds., Satellite Communications in the 21 st Century: Trends and Technologies (Reston, V A: 
AIAA, 2003) 1 at 2. 
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100 times larger than those reached in pre-satellite days. 32 By 2009, annual revenues are 
expected to reach $80 billion for direct-to-home (satellite) television alone.33 
Communication satellites comprise the largest portion of the satellite industry's $180 
billion in revenues in 2005.34 
Militaries are increasingly dependent on space communications capabilities. 
During Operation DESERT STORM, fully 90 percent of aIl U.S. military 
communications traffic was borne by satellite.35 Prominent U.S. military 
communications satellite systems include the Defense Satellite Communications System 
III, the Global Broadcast System, the Milstar Satellite Communications System, Polar 
Military Satellite Communications, and the UHF Follow-On Satellite system.36 Future 
satellite systems include the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite 
Communications System (AEHF),37 the Enhanced Polar System, the Mobile User 
Objective System,38 the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT)39 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. at 69. 
34 Space Report, supra note 25 at 114. 
35 Dale R. Hamon and Walter G. Green III, "Space and Power Projection" (November 1994) Il Military 
Review 64 at 74. 
36 Mehuron, "Space Almanac", supra note 13 at 81-83. 
37 A VSAF constellation of communications satellites that will provide anti-jam and secure extremely high 
frequency communications (ERF) to the warfighter. The frrst launch is expected in 2008. V.S., 
Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System: Department of Defense Budgetfor 
FY 2008, (February 2007) at 62, online: V.S. Department of Defense Publications 
<http://www.defenselink.miVpubs/> (accessed 2 July 2007) [V.S., Costs by Weapon System]. 
38 A V.S. Navy satellite program, consisting ofa constellation of satellites providing advanced VHF 
narrow-band communications in support of deployed troops. The frrst such satellite is scheduled for launch 
in 2010. Ibid. at 61. 
39 TSAT is the intended replacement for the AEHF satellite constellation-which is itself a future system. 
TSAT will provide "secure, survivable, anti-jam communications for strategic and tactical users" by "using 
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and the Wideband Gap-tiller System.40 The United States military also uses numerous 
civilian satellites for communications.41 
B. Reconnaissance 1 Remote-Sensing Satellites 
Remote-sensing is "the sensing of the Earth' s surface from space by making use 
of the properties of electromagnetic waves emitted, reflected or diffracted by the sensed 
objects, for the purpose of improving natural resources management, land use and the 
protection of the environment.,,42 "[R]emote sensing has been used to gather information 
needed in the fields of agriculture, geography, geology, hydrology, oceanography, 
meteorology, pollution, natural disasters and other civilian endeavors, it also has been 
increasingly used for military reconnaissance and verification of arms control agreements 
.... ,,43 Remote-sensing has also been used for mapping, search and rescue operations and 
forest tire recognition.44 
There are approximately 116 active remote-sensing satellites of various types, 
orbits and functions45 in space.46 There is a large legal advantage to taking pictures from 
internet protocol packet switching and laser technologies." First launch is expected in FY 2014. Ibid. at 
69. 
40 A tive-satellite communications constellation to be launched in FY 2007. Ibid. at 70. 
41 E.g., Iridium, Orbcomm, Pan Am Sat, Inmarsat, Globalstar, Intelsat and Telstar. Mehuron, "Space 
Almanac", supra note 13 at 83-84. 
42 Principles Relating ta Remate Sensing afthe Earthfram Outer Space, GA Res. 41/65, UN GAOR, 41st 
Sess., UN Doc. AlRES/41/65 (1986) princip le I(a). 
43 Stephen Gorove, "The U.N. Principles on Remote Sensing: Focus on Possible Controversial Issues" in 
Guido Rinaldi Baccelli, ed., Liber Amicorum Honouring'Nichalas Mateesca Matte: Beyand Boundaries 
(Montreal: De Daro Publishing, 1989) 105, at 106. 
44 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
45 1 broadly group as "remote-sensing" satellites variously categorized by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists as early warning satellites (9); various Earth observation satellites (25); Earth science (2); 
electronic intelligence satellites (6); various satellites cataloged merely as "remote-sensing" satellites (31); 
and, reconnaissance and surveillance satellites (43). 
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space (rather than from airplanes). Specifically, while States are sovereign over their 
airspace,47 outer space is completely free of all claims of sovereignty.48 Thus, though 
flying a plane without permission over another State's territory to take pictures would 
invoke prote st (at the least) and likely invoke a military response,49 taking pictures from a 
satellite has not involved even the slightest protests. 
Current U.S. military satellites providing surveillance ofvarious kinds include the 
Defense Support Program (provides early waming of missile launches)so and various 
classified systems "such as White Cloud (ocean reconnaissance), Aquacade (electronic 
. ferret), and Trumpet (Sigint), [that] are essentially open secrets but cannot be confirmed 
by the Intelligence Community."Sl Future planned satellite systems include Space Based 
Infrared System High (an advanced, steerable, missile waming surveillance system),S2 
46 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
47 "[E]very State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, art. 1. 
48 "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shaH be free for exploration and use by aIl 
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with intemationallaw, 
and there shall be free access to aIl are as of celestial bodies." Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
ojStates in the Exploration and Use ojOuter Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 
January 1967,610 U.N.T.S. 205, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [Outer Space Treaty]. 
49 In 1956 the U.S. began flights over the USSR in a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft called the U-2. In 
May of 1960, the US SR shot a U-2 flown by Gary Powers out ofits airspace, ending U.S. aerialoverflights 
over the USSR. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization ojSpace: Us. Policy, 1945-1984 ~ew York: Comell 
University Press, 1985) at 32 & 46. Powers successfully parachuted to safety, was captured, tried, 
convicted, and imprisoned until his release two years later in exchange for a Soviet spy. Bin Cheng, 
Studies in International Space Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 104, n.78. 
50 Mehuron, "Space Almanac", supra note 13 at 81-82. 
51 Ibid. at 83. 
52 A four-satellite constellation, consisting oftwo satellites in the Geostationary Orbit and two satellites in a 
highly elliptical orbit that will provide initial waming to the U.S. ofballistic missile attacks, provides 
battlespace awareness and conducts technical intelligence missions. This system is scheduled to begin 
operation in FY 2009. U.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at 67. See also Major General Frank 
Faykes, Director, Air Force Budget, "FY08 President's Budget" (5 February 2007) slide 41, online: 
Secretary of the Air Force: Financial Management & Comptroller 
<http://www.saffm.hq.af.miVshared/mediaidocumentlAFD-070212-012.pd!> (accessed 30 May 2007). See 
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Space Radar (aH weather, day and night tracking ofmoving or fixed ground targets in aH 
terrains, including within urban areas) , 53 and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
(used to detect and track ballistic missiles).54 V.S. governmental satellites can provide 
images with a resolution between .10 meters (the size of a baseball) and .15 meters 
(meaning that objects measuring .10 to .15 meters and larger will show up in their 
photoS).55 
V.S. military reconnaissance satellites enable the real-time tracking oftroops, 
vehicles, aircraft and even submarines, which, when combined with other space assets, 
"give commanders a continuous picture oftheir forces' location and movements .... ,,56 
Reconnaissance images are available at no cost to anyone with an Internet 
connection via Google Earth.57 Google Earth, an interactive map of the Earth, is 
constructed entirely of satellite images and provides free imagery to anyone with an 
Internet connection.58 Satellite photographs retrieved for free on Google Earth can be 
used in the planning ofmilitary attacks. Recently, photograph printouts taken from the 
Google Earth website were seized from homes of insurgents in Iraq. The photographs 
V.S., Vnited States Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformational Flight Plan (November 2003) at B-6 
[V.S., Transformational Flight Plan]. 
53 The first launch ofthis system is not planned until FY 2016. V.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 
37 at 68. See also V.S., Transformational Flight Plan, supra note 52 at B-6 and B-20. 
54 Mehuron, "Space Almanac", supra note 13 at 82. 
55 Ram Jakhu, "International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemination of Satellite Imagery" 
(2003) 29 J. Space L. 65 at 66 & 71. 
56 William B. Scott, "Improved Milspace Key to Antiterrorism War; Investments in 'blue force tracking' 
and real time air strike monitoring systems pay dividends in Afghanistan" AW&ST 155:24 (10 December 
2001)36. 
57 Google Earth, Online: Google Earth <http://earth.google.com> (accessed Il June 2007). 
58 Space Report, supra note 25 at 85. 
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showed detailed pictures of British bases, including their tents, restrooms, and parking for 
their military vehicles. 59 On the back of the retrieved pictures, insurgents had written the 
precise longitude and latitude coordinates for potential targets.60 Several nations (the 
U.K., India, South Korea and the Netherlands) have complained about the potential use 
by terrorists of the information freely available on Google Earth.61 
Civil and commercial remote-sensing satellites can provide images with a 
resolution finer than 39 meters.62 The highest resolution image currently available from a 
commercial satellite is .6 meters.63 In 2005, the commercial remote-sensing industry had 
revenues of about $1.12 billion.64 The expense of manufacturing and launching these 
satellites is where corporations make their money-it has been estimated that between 
2004 and 2013 approximately 170 remote-sensing satellites will be manufactured-
costing an estimated $15.5 billion.65 Governments remain the main clientele for the 
majority of the images sold by commercial remote-sensing satellites.66 
59 Lester Haines, "Google erases British bases in Iraq" The Register (17 January 2007), online: The 
Register <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/17/google_erases _ brit_ bases> (accessed 9 July 2007). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Dinesh C. Shanna, "Indian president warns against Google Earth" CNET News. com (17 October 2005), 
online: CNET News.com <http://news.com.coml1ndian+president+warns+against+Google+Earth/2100-
1028_3-5896888.html> (accessed Il June 2007). 
62 Space Report, supra note 25 at 7. 
63 Digital Globe, a V.S. company, owns Quickbird 2, which is capable oftaking images with a resolution of 
.6 meters-you can see objects measuring a mere 2 feet across. "Digital Globe Fact Sheet", online: Digital 
Globe <http://www.digitalglobe.com/aboutlfactsheet.shtml> (accessed 19 June 2007). 
64 Space Report, supra note 25 at 71. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. at 57. 
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c. Navigation Satellites 
Navigation satellites report to us ers their exact position to within 5 to 10 meters, 
day or night and in aIl weather conditions.67 They are even more accurate for stationary 
objects-providing positions to within a few centimeters.68 AU a user needs in order to 
use these satellites is a simple receiver to pick up the signaIs transmitted by the 
navigational satellites. Such receivers are now common in airplanes, boats, cars, ceU 
phones and even watches.69 "Satellite navigation delivers positioning and time, 
independent ofweather, around the globe and in space near the earth, 24 hours a day. It 
is thereby more efficient in terms of accuracy, availability, integrity and continuity than 
any other terrestrial sens or or method.,,7o 
There are currently 62 active navigational satellites.71 These systems, coUectively 
known as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), are made up of the United States 
Global Positioning System (GPS),n Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS),73 China's Beidou navigation satellites,14 and one satellite belonging to the 
67 "ESA Navigation" online: European Space Agency 
<http://www.esa.int/esaNA/GGGYC650NDC_index_O.html> (accessed 9 July 2007). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Günter W. Hein, "Satellite Navigation" in Feuerbacher & Stoewer, supra note 12,251 at 251. 
71 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
72 GPS is the U.S. space-based radio-navigation system consisting of24 satellites orbiting 12,600 miles 
above the Earth. It provides positioning, navigation and timing services to the U.S. military, and is also 
freely-available to civilians around the world. "Global Positioning System: Serving the World" online: 
Global Positioning System <http://www.gps.gov>. 
73 GLONASS is Russia's constellation of24 navigation satellites (3 ofthem are spares) orbiting the Earth . 
at an altitude of 19,100 km. GLONASS is not operating at full capacity. Only 17-18 of the satellites are 
currently in orbit and four ofthem are reportedly switched off. See Russian Space Agency, online: Russian 
Space Agency <http://www.glonass-ianc.rsa.rulpls/htmldb/f?p=202:20:6005261717971 075290::NO> 
(accessed 9 July 2007). See also UCS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
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European Space Agency (the first satellite of Europe's planned Galileo navigation 
system). 75 
GPS provides the U.S. military "a global, three-dimensional positioning, velocity 
and time information system for aircraft, artillery, ships, tanks and other weapons 
delivery systems.,,76 This navigation capability functions day and night and in any 
weather. 
GPS is also used by the United States military for precision targeting. One B-2 
"Spirit" bomber deploying 16 GPS precision-guided Joint-Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAMs), has the same destructive capacity of 1,500 B-17 sorties carrying 1,125 tons of 
non-precision-guided ("dumb") bombs in World War II.77 Using precision targeting, in 
October of2003, one B-2 bomber successfully targeted 80 separate targets using 80 
JDAMs in a single 22-second pass.78 The all-weather ability provided by GPS-guided 
munitions provides a distinct advantage over other precision-guided munitions (i.e., laser 
and electro-optical-guided munitions) as these other munitions are far less accurate when 
74 The Beidou Navigation System consists oftwo satellites in the Geostationary orbit. Shu-Hsien Liao, 
"Will China become a military space superpower?" (August 2005) 21:3 Space Pol'y 205 at 209. 
75 The European Union has been planning its own global navigation system of 30 satellites to rival the 
U.S.'s GPS satellites. The navigation system has encountered serious financial troubles and willlikely 
only be completed in 2010 or 2011 if the EU increases public funding for the project. The CUITent plan for 
funding provides that two-thirds of the construction and launch costs of the 30 satellites would come from a 
consortium of eight private companies. "EU sees public money saving Galileo from drifting off course" 
GPS Daily (11 May 2007), online: GPS Daily 
<http://www.gpsdaily.comireportsIEU _Sees_Public _ Money _Savins-Galileo ]rom _ Drifting_ Ofe Course_ 
999.html> (accessed 6 Ju1y 2007). 
76 U.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at 65. 
77 Brian E. Fredriksson, "Globalness: Toward a Space Power Theory" (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 
Press, 2006) at 18. 
78 "Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)," online: Defense Update: International Online Defense 
Magazine <http://www.defense-update.comlproducts/j/jdam.htm> (accessed 7 June 2007). 
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visibility is poor (e.g., due to cloud cover or sandstorms).79 As Air Force General Kevin 
P. Chilton, Commander of Air Force Space Command, recently testified before the 
House Armed Services Committee, "GPS is integral to numerous battlefield innovations, 
including the Small Diameter Bomb, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System and 
Joint Precision Air Drop System. We have also delivered almost 100,000 advanced GPS 
receivers to the field."so The combination of precision targeting and pinpoint navigation 
(even across trackless deserts) has made GPS indispensable to the U.S. military. 
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) have been widely used by the civil 
aviation community for the increased capabilities it provides for navigating aircraft. 
Using GNSS, aircraft can be guided on more precise routes, burning less fuel and saving 
time. Using GNSS, less time is needed between landing each aircraft, increasing the 
volume oftraffic an airport can safely handle (and further saving on fuel costs). The 
former President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
Assad Kotaite, described global navigation satellite systems as "an electronic aid which 
may be used to determine in the course ofaircraft flight the real-time position of the 
aircraft, its course and distance to the desired destination, and any deviation from the 
desired track."Sl 
79 U.S., United States Air Force, Spaee Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 (27 November 2006) 
at 33 [U.S., Spaee Operations]. 
80 U.S., FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Budget Request and the Status ofSpaee Aetivities: 
Hearing Before the Strategie Forces Subeommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 110th Congo 
(23 March 2007) at Il (General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, Air Force Space Command), online: House 
Armed Services Committee <http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml>[U.S.,Chilton 
Testimony] (accessed 10 June 2007). 
81 Assad Kotaite, "ICAO's Role With Respect to the Institutional Arrangements and Legal Framework of 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Planning and Implementation" (1996) XXI-II Ann. Air & Sp. 
L. 195 at 196. 
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In addition to their value to the military and aviation communities, navigation 
satellites are widely used in a wide range of other civil applications, including: maritime 
navigation; roads and highways; space applications; agriculture; train transportation; 
environmental applications; surveying and mapping; and, recreational use. 82 In 2005, 
revenues for GNSS applications were $22 billion.83 
D. Weather Satellites 
Weather satellites ("meteorological" satellites) are widely used for monitoring 
clouds, winds, temperature and humidity, precipitation, waves, aerosols and trace gases, 
and forest fires. 84 They allow increasingly accurate weather prediction, including severe 
weather forecasting of tomadoes, winter storms and hurricanes.85 Weather reports are not 
merely convenient for planning travel and recreational activities, but also for planning 
military operations. Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist from the 6th Century B.C., 
considered the importance ofweather when writing his famous book, The Art ofWar. He 
wrote of the weather as "Heaven" and noted "[i]fyou know Heaven [the weather] and 
know Earth [the terrain], your victory can be complete.,,86 In March of2003, amid rain 
and low visibility, over 1,000 D.S. soldiers waited aboard 17 C-17 Globemaster HIs for 
the right weather to be able to parachute into northem Iraq. In spite of mission-
preventing weather, the weather officer, consulting data obtained from weather satellites, 
assured commanders the weather would c1ear up long enough for the mission to 
82 "Global Positioning System: Serving the W orld" online: Global Positioning System 
<http://www.gps.gov> (accessed 10 July 2007). 
83 Space Report, supra note 25 at 72. 
84 ues Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Sun Tzu, The Art ofWar (New York: Bames & Noble Books, 1994) at 215. 
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proceed-as predicted, the clouds parted and the jump was able to continue as planned.87 
Weather satellites are critical not only for deciding when to stage an attack, but what 
munitions to use (laser-, infrared and optical-guided munitions require relatively clear 
weather).88 
The V.S. military currently operates a couple of military weather satellites, known 
;. 
together as the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.89 The V.S. military also 
makes use of civilian systems for its meteorological requirements.90 The V.S. Air Force 
(VSAF) is building a 4-satellite constellation known as the National Polar-Orbiting 
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) to monitor world-wide 
environmental conditions, covering land, ocean and near-space.91 This system is 
expected begin operations in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 (between 1 October 2012 and 30 
September 2013).92 
Calculating the total number of active meteorological satellites is somewhat 
difficult. There are about 39 weather satellites listed on the VCS Database, and many 
more that could have been grouped as weather satellites, but were instead grouped as 
"research" or "remote-sensing" satellites.93 
871. G. Buzanowski, "Space superiority a priority for Air Force authority" Air Force Print News (12 April 
2006) online: Air Force Link <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123018955> (accessed 31 May 
2007). 
88 Chun, Defending Space, supra note Il at 44. 
89 Mehuron, "Space Almanac", supra note 13 at 81. 
90 Ibid. at 83-84. 
91 U.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at 66. 
92 Ibid. at 62. 
93 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
19 
E. Research Satellites 
Research satellites make up around Il percent ofthe total 847 satellites.94 
Satellites study numerous aspects ofboth the Earth and space. Topics under study 
inc1ude: Earth's gravit y fields; Earth's environment; Earth's aurora; Earth's magnetotail; 
sea-Ievel changes; wave heights; oceanography and charting of ocean resources; land and 
agricultural surveys; fundamental aspects of the universe; solar irradiance; garnma-ray 
sky; and, solar winds.95 
F. Manned Space Missions 
The database created by the Union of Concemed Scientists96 completely omitted 
manned satellites (perhaps because oftheir temporary nature-for example, do you count 
each of the U.S. Space Shuttles every time they complete a mission or only once?). For 
the sake ofstatistics, and following the example of the Union ofConcemed Scientists, l 
have kept manned space missions out of aIl statistical calculations. 
Of the eight States that have the technical means to launch an object into space, 
only the U.S., Russia, and recently, China97 have the ability to launch a human being into 
space. Apollo Il's trip to the Moon in 1969 was certainly the most famous of the 
manned space missions. Apollo Il was not the first manned space mission, however. 
There had been 18 manned missions from 1961 through 1968 and another 3 manned 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 On 15 October 2003, China became the third country to launch an astronaut into orbit. Brian Harvey, 
China 's Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (London: Springer, 2004) at xi. 
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space missions in 1969 besides Apollo 11.98 Between 1961 and 2005 there were a total 
of 144 manned spaceflights, carrying 743 people into space.99 
Despite the se forays into space, mankind has only skimmed the surface of 
exploration. Consider that the farthest a manned spaceflight has ventured into space was 
to the moon-238,855 miles (384,400 km). 100 For a little perspective, our Sun is 92.96 
million mileslol away from the Earth and is only one of about 200 billion stars that make 
up our galaxy (the Milky Way)102-and the Milky Way is only one of billions ofknown 
galaxies. 103 AIl ofthese stars and galaxies are tremendous distances from each other-
for example, the nearest star to our Sun is Proxima Centauri-which is about 
24,634,400,000,000 miles from the Sun. 104 
The D.S. Space Shuttle completed 114 missions in the 25 years preceding 2005. 
It helped in the construction and logistical support of the International Space Station, 
conducted scientific missions, missions for the Department of Defense, satellite 
98 Mehuron, "Space Almanac", supra note 13 at 79. 
99 Ibid. Sorne ofthese people have ventured into space more than once. For the numbers ofactual human 
beings who have made it to space (one or more times), it is probably more accurate just to say "over 400." 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Space Station" online: NASA 
<http://www.nasa.gov/missionyages/stationlmainlindex.html> (accessed 18 May 2007). 
100 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Solar System Exploration" online: NASA 
<http://sse.jpl.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfm?Object=Moon> (accessed 8 June 2007). 
101 The distance from the Earth to the Sun is cotnInonly referred to as one Astronomical Unit (AU) to avoid 
the incredibly large numbers that would result if distances were measured miles or kilometers. National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Basics of Space Flight" online: Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
<http://www2.jpl.nasa.govlbasicslbsfl-l.html> (accessed 8 June 2007). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Once scientists begin measuring distances ofthis magnitude, they usually use the "light year" or the 
distance that a beam oflight can travel in a year. Light travels at about 300,000 km per second. Proxima 
Centauri is about 4.2 light years from our Sun. Ibid. 
21 
deployments, repairs and retrievals and cooperative missions to the Russian Mir Space 
Station. lOS 
Russia's Mir space station was originally designed for military uses, but was later 
used for scientific investigations. 106 The Mir space station orbited the Earth at a height of 
300-400 km above the Earth. 107 It provided Russia a continuous presence in space for 15 
years (from 1986 until 2001), and was visited by over 100 astronauts. 108 
Today's most famous manned space station is the International Space Station, a 
combined international effort of sixteen States. 109 The International Space Station, 
probably the large st engineering feat ever attempted by mankind, 110 was conceived for 
the vague purpose of "enhancing the scientific, technological, and commercial use of 
outer space."l1 1 
The International Space Station is not registered in the D.N. registry of space 
objects as a single space station; rather, each and every module sent to the International 
105 Roger D. Launius, "Accessing the Legacy of the Space Shuttle" (November 2006) 22:4 Space Pol'y 226 
at 230. 
106 Feuerbacher, supra note 12 at 16. 
107 Lorenz Ratke, "Materials Sciences" in Feuerbacher & Stoewer, supra note 12, 297 at 342. 
108 Ibid. 
109 The 15 States cooperating on the International Space Station include the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada 
and the eleven States that are members of the European Space Agency (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Agreement 
among the government of Canada, governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the 
government of Japan, the government of the Russian Federation, and the government of the United States 
of America concerning cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998, Hein's No. 
KA V 5119, reprinted in United States Space Law: National & International Regulation, Vol. 4 (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1980), II.A. 22(1) (May 1998) [1998 IGA]. 
110 NASA considers the construction of the International Space Station as likely more difficult than their 
earlier mission to land on the moon. U.S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, FY 2008 
Budget Estimates, (2007) at 2, online: NASA < http://www.nasa.gov/about/budgetlindex.html> [U.S., 
NASA Budget] (accessed 2 July 2007). 
III 1998 IGA, supra note 109, art. 1(1). 
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Space Station is required to be registered by the State that sent it. 112 It was designed for a 
crew of between six or seven to live and work in a Low Earth Orbit of around 400 km. 113 
It has been scaled down to a crew ofthree1l4 and is currently orbiting the Earth at around 
350 km. 115 The first portion of the International Space Station to reach orbit was a 
Russian cargo bay in November of 1998. 116 Though completion was originally planned 
for the end of 2004,117 the International Space Station is still far from completion. 118 The 
original anticipated cost of the project was between $60-100 billion. 119 George 
Washington University's Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute also 
recently estimated the total cost of the International Space Station at $100 billion. 120 The 
112 "In accordance with Article II of the Registration Convention, each Partner shall register as space 
objects the flight elements ... which it provides .... " 1998 IGA, supra note 109, art. 5(1). 
113 Alexander V. Yakovenko, "The intergovernmental agreement on the International Space Station" (May 
1999) 15:2 Space Pol'y 79 at 84. 
114 V.S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, International Space Station Guide, (16 January 
2007) at Introduction, online: NASA, 
<http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/stationlnews/ISS _Reference _ Guide.htrnl> [V.S., Space Station 
Guide] (accessed 10 July 2007). 
115 V.S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, International Space Station Status Report: S S07-
26 (15 May 2007) online: NASA, 
<http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/mayIHQ_SS0726 _station _status.html> (accessed 6 July 2007). 
116 Yakovenko, supra note 113 at 84. 
117 Rochus Moenter, "The International Space Station: Legal Framework and CUITent Status" (1999) 64 J. 
Air L. & Corn. 1033 at 1036. 
118 NASA currently predicts the International Space Station will be fully assembled in 2010. V.S., Space 
Station Guide, supra note 114 at Introduction. 
119 Moenter, supra note 117 at 1036. 
120 "Executive Report: Space Safety Report: Vulnerabilities and Risk Reduction in V.S. Human Space 
Flight Programs" (March 2005) at VII, online: A'stronaut Space Safety 
<http://www.spacesafety.org/spacesafety05.htrnl> (accessed 4 June 2007). 
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U.S. spent at least $6.8 billion on the International Space Station in 2006 alone and the 
anticipated budget from 2007 through 2010 is another $26 billion. 121 
Space stations, inc1uding the International Space Station, have been widely used 
for research. Studies inc1ude research on weightlessness, micro gravit y, telemedicine, 
earth observations (its range covers over 90 percent of the populated areas of Earth 122), 
protein crystal growth experiments, and, of course, one large experiment on living in 
space, a precursor to any long manned space flight. 123 
A final manned space activity that is currently vogue among the extremely 
wealthy is space tourism. From April 2001 to April 2007, five people (four from the D.S. 
and one from South Africa) bought rides to the International Space Station aboard the 
Russian Soyuz rocket at a cost of over $20 million per ride. 124 Cheaper travel to space is 
currently being developed by a couple of private companies. Both Virgin Galactic and 
the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company have plans to take tourists into 
Low Earth Orbit for about $200,000 a seat by 2010. Their customers would have the 
chance to experience weightlessness for about six minutes and have the opportunity to 
see the curvature of the Earth from in space. 125 
121 The D.S. spent $1.7 billion for the International Space Station, another $4.8 billion for the Space Shuttle 
(largely transportation and logistical support to and from the International Space Station) and another $338 
million for space and flight support for the pro gram. The budget request is anticipated to be slightly more 
for the next four years. U.S., NASA Budget, supra note 110 at 9. 
122 D.S., Space Station Guide, supra note 114 at 90. 
123 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "ISS Research" online: 
<http://exploration.nasa.gov/programs/station/index.html> (accessed 18 May 2007). 
124 Voice of America, "Fifth 'Space Tourist' Begins Flight to International Space Station" US Fed News 
Service (8 April 2007), online: Voice of America <http://www.voanews.comlenglish/archive/2007-
04/2007-04-08-voa4.cfm?CFID=151305024&CFTOKEN=14613249> (accessed 18 May 2007). 
125 "Eads is aiming to beat Branson as tourismjoins the space race" Evening Standard (12 June 2007) 28. 
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Future planned forays into space inc1ude D.S. plans to send a manned spaceflight 
back to the Moon and then on to Mars. 126 China has the goal of having a manned space 
station by 2020 127 and perhaps also sending a man to the Moon by the same year. 128 
Russia is also contemplating manned missions to Mars between 2020 and 2030. 129 
Having addressed the wide variety of satellites (cuITent and future), and their 
diverse applications-both military and civilian-l turn to the variety ofweapons that 
have been created to destroy or disable these satellites-ASATs. 
126 The V.S.'s 2006 National Space Policy speaks of the V.S. "objective of extending the human presence 
across the solar system". V.S., us. National Space Policy, National Security Presidential Directive-49 (31 
August 2006) at 2 [V.S., 2006 National Space Policy]. President Bush also listed in his "Vision for V.S. 
Space Exploration" the goal to "[e]xtend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human 
return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations." 
V.S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration (February 2004) 
online: NASA <http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/exploration/main/index.html> (accessed 8 June 2007). 
127 V.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People 's Republic of 
China (2007) at 20, online: V.S. Department of Defense Publications 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html>[US .• 2007ReportonChina·sMilitary Power] (accessed 5 
July 2007). 
128 "China's Moon Flights" online: Space Today Online 
<http://www.spacetoday.org/China/ChinaMoonflight.html>(accessed8June2007).China·s recent space 
policy however, did not mention the return to the Moon as one of the goals ofits space program. White 
Paper issued by the Information Office ofChina's State Council (October 2006), online: Peoples Daily 
Online website http://english.people.com.cn/20061O/12/eng20061012_311149.htm1[China, White Paper] 
(accessed 8 June 2007). 
129 Yury Zaitsev, "Russian Space Goals in the Early 21st Century" Space Daily (2 January 2007), online: 
Space Daily 
<http://www.spacedaily.com/reportslRussian_Space_Goals_In _The _ Early _ 21 st_ CenturL999 .html>. 
(accessed 8 June 2007). 
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Chapter Two: Anti-Satellite Weapons 
A. Past, Present & Future ASATs 
ASATs are defined by the USAF as "direct ascent and co-orbital systems that 
employ various mechanisms to affect or destroy an on-orbit spacecraft.,,130 They can be 
broken into several categories: High altitude nuc1ear explosions, kinetic-energy ASATs, 
laser ASATs, various electronic 'jamming" measures, and ballistic missile defense 
systems. 
1. High Altitude Nuc/ear Explosions 
In 1958, to study the effects of a nuc1ear explosion in space and to see if such an 
explosion could destroy a satellite, theU.S. launched three X-17A missiles armed with 
nuc1ear warheads off a ship (the USS Norton Sound) in a series ofthree tests called 
Project Argus. l3l The results of the project confirmed that nuc1ear explosions in space 
could be used to destroy satellites-specifically, the nuc1ear explosions "created free 
electrons that produced X-rays capable of damaging electronic components and erasing 
computer memories.,,132 
Four years later, Project STARFISH Prime, was jointly conducted by the USAF 
and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. On 9 July 1962, the U.S. detonated a nuc1ear-
tipped Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile 248 miles above Johnston Island in the 
Pacific. This missile was several hundred times stronger than those previously tested in 
130 U.S., United States Air Force, Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1 (2 August 
2004) at 33 [U.S., Counterspace Operations]. 
131 Chun, Clayton, K.S. Shooting Down a "Star"; Program 437, the US Nuc/ear ASAT System and 
Present-Day Copycat Kil/ers (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000), at 3-4 [Chun, Shooting 
Down a Star]. 
132 Ibid. at 3. 
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Project Argus. 133 The results were dramatic. Electrical systems in Hawaii (715 miles 
away) were knocked out134 by the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from the nuclear 
explosion.135 The explosion also "seriously damaged the solar panels ofthree orbiting 
satellites even though they were not in the line-of-sight of the nuclear detonation.,,136 
Sorne have characterized Project STARFISH as a test of a high-altitude nuclear weapon 
that, only incidentally (or even "accidentally") destroyed a number of satellites orbiting 
nearby.137 
After Project STARFISH, the V.S. developed ASAT programs for destroying 
satellites by detonating a nuclear device nearby. In the 1960's, the V.S. had two nuclear 
ASAT programs, both using surface to air missiles. First, was an Army program called 
Program 505, or "Nike-Zeus." Program 505, based at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacifie, 
could destroy a satellite in Low Earth Orbit by launching a Nike-Zeus surface to air 
missile to explode near the target satellite-creating a 400-kiloton138 nucIear 
explosion. 139 Program 437 (code-named SQVANTO TERROR), like Project 
STARFISH, launched a Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile from Johnston Island to 
133 Chun, Shooting Down a Star, supra note 131 at 3-4. 
134 Effects included "the failure of street lighting systems, tripping of circuit breakers, triggering of burglar 
alarms, and damage to a telecommunications relay facility." Independent Working Group, Missile Defense, 
the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign 
Policy Analysis, 2006) at 8-9, online: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
<http://www.ifpa.orgipublicationsIIWGReport.htm> [Independent Working Group] (accessed 10 July 
2007). 
135 Chun, Shooting Down a Star, supra note 131 at 4. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Karas, supra note 1 at 148. 
138 400,000 tons. 
139 Chun, Defending Space, supra note Il at 32-33. 
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deliver a 1.44 megaton140 nuclear explosion to destroy satellites. 141 Both programs had 
only limited capability as an ASAT for several reasons. First, they were both operated 
from fixed stations-hence they would have to wait for their target to orbit past them 
before they could fire on it. 142 
Second, the fact that both programs launched a nuclear-tipped warhead was also a 
limitation, as after the ST ARFISH tests, it was apparent that any nuclear explosion in 
space would likely damage any U.S. satellites in the vicinity of the target. 143 
Furthermore, attacking a satellite with a nuclear-tipped ASAT may weIl trigger a nuclear 
war.
144 Though both programs went operational in May of 1964, Pro gram 505 was 
discontinued two years later in deference to Pro gram 437. 145 Besides the stronger 
nuclear explosion, Pro gram 437' s Thor missile had a range of 1,500 miles,146 
substantially greater than the Nike-Zeus's range of250 miles. 147 Program 437's 
launchers remained ready to launch until1975. 148 One strange fact about these ASAT 
programs is that they were in operation after President Kennedy had signed the Limited 
140 1,440,000 tons. "[T]he lethal range of even a I-megaton explosion against a satellite hardened to 
feasible hardness is less than 100 km. (An unhardened civilian communication satellite could be damaged 
at distances ofthousands ofkilometers by a high-yield nuclear explosion in space.)" Michael M. May, 
"Safeguarding Our Military Space Systems" (18 April 1986) 232:4748 Science 336 at 337. 
141 Chun, Defending Space, supra note Il at 33. 
142 Stares, supra note 49 at 81. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Chun, Shooting Down a Star, supra note 131 at 21. 
145 David W. Zeigler, "Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary" in Bruce M. DeBlois, ed., 
Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence ofSpace Power Thought, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press, 1999) 185 at 196. 
146 Chun, Shooting Down a Star, supra note 130 at 71, n. 12. 
147 Ibid. at 8. 
148 Karas, supra note 1 at 149. 
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Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty, in fact, President Kennedy approved Program 437 the day after 
he signed the treaty.149 The Limited Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty made it unlawful to 
detonate nuclear weapons in space (but it arguably only restricted "tests"). 150 
Nuclear ASATs remain a threat to satellite systems. "To execute this mission, aIl 
that is needed is a rocket and a simple nuclear device." 151 Eight, or perhaps nine, 
countries currently possess nuclear weapons: the U.S., Russia, China, the D.K., France, 
India, Pakistan, Israel and possibly North Korea. 152 Iran also possesses missiles that 
could carry a warhead to the necessary altitude and is believed to be trying to develop 
nuclear weapons. 153 This is especially conceming considering the famous position of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, "Israel must be wiped out from the map of the 
149 Zeigler, supra note 145 at 196. 
150 "Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuc1ear 
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in 
the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space .... " Treaty Banning Nuc/ear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 5 August 1963,480 U.N.T.S. 43, 14 U.S.T. l313. 
151 U.S., Report of the Commission to Access United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization: Pursuant to Public Law 106-65 (lI January 2001) 22 [O.S., Space Commission Report]. 
152 "Space Security Index 2006", supra note 18 at 427. See Joseph Cirincione, "The Declining Ballistic 
Missile Threat, 2005" Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace (February 2005), online: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 
<http://www.carnegieendowment.orgifileslDecliningBallisticMissileThreat2005-2.pdf> (accessed 29 May 
2007). 
153 U.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 22. In 2006, the U.S. Congress made the following 
findings regarding North Korea and Iran when approving missile-defense capabilities: "According to 
assessments by the intelligence community of the United States, North Korea tested in 2005 a new solid 
propellant short-range ballistic missile, conducted a launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile/space 1aunch 
vehicle in 2006, and is likely developing intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missile 
capabilities that could someday reach as far as the United States with a nuclear payload." Furthermore, 
"[a]ccording to assessments by the intelligence community of the United States, Iran continued in 2005 to 
test its medium-range ballistic missile, and the danger that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon and integrate 
it with a ballistic missile Iran aIready possesses is a reason for immediate concern." Policy of the United 
States on priorities in the development, testing, andfielding ofmissile defense capabilities, Pub. L. No. 
109-364,120 Stat. 2130 (2006). 
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world. And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a 
world without the United States and Zionism.,,154 
As Lt. Col. Clayton Chun wrote in April 2000, "Tho se nations capable of 
producing an ASAT system at least equivalent to Pro gram 437 and its Thor-c1ass booster 
inc1ude Russia, North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK), 
Iran, India, the People's Republic of China (PRe), and Libya.,,155 
2. Kinetic Energy ASATs 
Kineticenergy ASATs destroy satellites by directly colliding with them. They 
inc1ude interceptor missiles ofvarious kinds, space mines (not yet developed, but 
conceived of for decades), and arguably, spacecraft that can be maneuvered into 
satellites. 
The former USSR's main ASAT is the co-orbital satellite interceptor system-a 
large device, weighing over 4,400 pounds that is launched into orbit on an old SS-9 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).156 This ASAT orbits the Earth a couple of 
times as it gradually approaches its target satellite. 157 When the ASAT is within a 
kilometer of the target it explodes into pellets directed towards the target satellite. 158 
From 1968 until 1982, the USSR tested 20 ofthese interceptor satellites against target 
satellites. Target satellites were destroyed between 230 km to perhaps as high as 1,575 
154 "Iranian leader: Wipe out Israel" CNN International (27 October 2005), online: CNN International 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meastlI0/26/ahmadinejadlindex.html> (accessed 24 June 2007). 
155 Chun, Shooting Down a Star, supra note 131 at 36. 
156 Kurt Gottfried & Richard Ned Lebow, "Anti-Satellite Weapons: Weighing the Risks" in Franklin A. 
Long, Donald Hafner & Jeffrey Boutwell, eds., Weapons in Space (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1986) 147 at 150. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
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km. 159 For sorne reason, however, the now-disbanded U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment estimated that the Soviet system could destroy satellites up to an altitude of 
5,000 km. 160 In August 1983, the USSR stopped the testing ofits co-orbital satellite 
interceptor system in what has been called a "self-imposed moratorium.,,161 
The use of a co-orbital satellite ASAT had previously been explored by the U.S. 
in its first ASAT program. 162 In the 1950's, the US. developed project SAINT (SAtellite 
INTerceptor)-a satellite that was designed to enter orbit, intercept, inspect and destroy a 
satellite. 163 SAINT ASATs were never produced-they never made it past research and 
development when the project was cancelled in 1962.164 Instead, unti11975, the U.S. 
pursued its nuclear-armed Thor and Nike-Zeus ASAT programs. 
In 1985, US. President Ronald Reagan notified Congress ofhis intent to test a 
new ASAT weapon. 165 Speaking of the USSR's co-orbital interceptor system, he noted, 
"[t]he USSR has the world's only operational ASAT system with an effective capability 
159 The Soviets succeeded in destroying satellites up to 1005 km (on both 4 Apr 71 and 14 Mar 1981). The 
Soviet test of 17 Jun 97 against a satellite at 1,575 km was deemed a success, though it is uncertain both as 
to whether it was successfu1 and also at the altitude of the attempted intercept. Out of the 20 Soviet tests, 
between 20 Oct 68 and 18 Jun 82, nine were deemed to have probably been successful. MichaeIO'Hanlon, 
Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses ofSpace (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004) at 10-11. 
160 U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control 
(1985) at Il [U.S., Office of Technology Assessment Report]. 
161 Ibid. at 10. It is important to note, however, that though th$'! USSR had proposed a "moratorium" on 
testing new ASATs, they were unwilling to dismantle their current ASA T program-which sorne cali the 
world' s only currently operational ASA T pro gram. Stares, supra note 49 at 197. 
162 Donald L. Hafner, "A verting a Brobdingnagian Skeet Shoot: Arms Control Measures for Anti-Satellite 
Weapons" (Winter 1980-1981) 5:3 International Security 41 at 45 [Hafner, "ASAT Arms Control"]. 
163 Ibid. at 45. See also Chun, Defending Space, supra note Il at 36. 
164 Hafner, "ASAT Arms Control", supra note 162 at 45. 
165 U.S., Congo Rec., vol. 131, 108, at H7248 (4 September 1985). 
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to seek and destroy critical V.S. space systems in near-earth orbit.,,166 Days later, the 
V.S. tested an ASAT pro gram known as the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV). 
The ALMV is launched from an F -15 fighter j et on a two-stage rocket. 167 In contrast to 
Russia's co-orbital ASAT, the ALMV never enters into an orbit, but proceeds directly 
from the F -15 to the path in front of the target satellite, which is destroyed by the high-
speed collision with the ALMV. 168 The ALMV was successfull y tested on 13 September 
1985. An F-15 released its missile at about 10 km above the Earth and the missile was 
propelled into the U.S.'s Solewind P78-1 satellite, which was in orbit approximately 500 
km above the Earth' s surface. 169 On impact, the ALMV, traveling at a speed of 10 km 
per second, shattered the Solewind satellite into more than 200 pieces. 170 The VSAF had 
planned to purchase 112 ofthese ASATs for use on 20 F-15Ajets but from 1985 to 1988 
Congress largely banned the testing ofthis ASAT in space. Specifically, in 1984, the 
V.S. Congress passed a law that prevented any of the funds it had appropriated to the 
Department of Defense from being used to "test against an object in space the miniature 
homing vehicle (MHV) anti-satellite warhead launched from an F-15 aircraft unless the 
President determines and certifies to Congress" four requirements: (1) that he was 
endeavoring to reach an agreement with the VSSR limiting ASAT weapons; (2) that 
166 Ibid. 
167 The first stage is propelled by an AGM-69 Short-Range Attack Missile, while the second stage of 
propulsion is via a Thiokol Altair rocket. Renee, it has been noted as a "missile" by sorne sources and a 
"rocket" by others-both characterizations are accurate depending on the stage of propulsion being 
addressed. Bhupendra Jasani, "Space Weapons-Technical Aspects" in Bhupendra Jasani, ed. Space 
Weapons and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 14 at 15-16 [Jasani, "Space 
Weapons"]. 
168 Gottfried & Lebow, supra note 156 at 151-52. 
169 Jasani, "Space Weapons", supra note 167 at 16-17. 
170 Ibid. at 17. 
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pending the agreement with the USSR, testing the ALMV against objects in space was 
"necessary to avert c1ear and irrevocable harm to the national security;" (3) "that such 
testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects for 
negotiations on anti-satellite weapons;" and (4) that any testing would be consistent with 
U.S. obligations under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.17l 
In 1985, Congress again inc1uded similar language restricting the testing of the 
ALMV unless the President made determinations and certifications to Congress as 
provided in the previous year's restriction. 172 Then, in 1986, Congress legislated a 
moratorium on ASAT testing, specifically, "[t]he Secretary of Defense may not carry out 
a test of the Space Defense System (anti-satellite weapon) against an object in space until 
the President certifies to Congress that the Soviet Union has conducted, after the date of 
the enactment ofthis Act, a test against an object in space of a dedicated anti-satellite 
weapon.,,173 In 1987 Congress yet again passed a law against the testing of the ALMV 
against an object in space unless the USSR first tested an ASAT against an object in 
space. 174 In 1988, the USAF withdrew its request for funding of this ASAT and it has 
never again been used or tested. 175 The USSR was reportedly working on a similar 
ASA T, launched from a Mi G-31 j et, but this ASA T was never tested. 176 
171 PoUcy governing the testing of anti-satellite warheads, Pub. 1. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1941 (1984). 
172 Testing of anti-satellite weapons and space survivability program, Pub. 1. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 610 
(1985). 
173 Limitation on testing of anti-satellite weapons; expiration, Pub. 1. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3847 (1986). 
174 One-year United States moratorium on testing antisatellite weapons, Pub. 1. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 
1048 (1987). 
175 Directory ofU.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, "Vought ASM-135 ASAT" <http://www.designation-
systems.netldusrmlm-135.html> (accessed Il May 2007). 
176 "Space Security Index 2006", supra note 18 at 424. 
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At a cost of about $350 million, from 1989 through 2004, the D.S. Army pursued 
a kinetic-energy ASAT program (KE ASAT).I77 The pro gram consisted of using a rocket 
booster (a Minuteman-c1ass booster) to launch a kinetic-kill vehic1e, capable of 
destroying any satellite in Low Earth Orbit. 178 The kinetic-kill vehicle was to separate 
from the booster, track the target satellite, and hit and disable the target satellite with a 
sheet of Mylar plastic-that could hit the target satellite without shattering it and hence, 
was supposed to avoid creating a lot of debris. 179 The KE ASAT pro gram was terminated 
in 1993, but continued to receive congressional funding in 1996, 1997, 1998,2000,2001 
and 2004. 180 
For nearly 20 years, (from 13 Sep 85 until 7 Jul 05) there was no testing ofkinetic 
energy ASATs. This ended on 7 JulOS, when China unsuccessfully tried to impact one 
oftheir satellites with a solid-fuel, medium-ranged missile (SC-19). They tried again on 
6 Feb 06. This test was also unsuccessful. Then on Il Jan 07, China tried again. This 
time they successfully intercepted one oftheir old weather satellites, the Feng-Yun lC, at 
an altitude of 865 km, exploding the satellite into thousands of pieces of debris. 181 
China's recently-demonstrated capability to target and destroy a satellite in Low 
Earth Orbit with a kinetic-based ASAT was demonstrably more advanced than the U.S. 
177 J. Michael Waller, "Militarizing Space" Insight Magazine (24 February 2001), online: Free Republic 
<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a983e8b6928.htm> (accessed 1 July 2007). 
178 William L. Spacy II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? (CADRE Paper, Maxwell 
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1999) at 61, online: Air University 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/spacey_ wl.pdf> (accessed 1 July 2007). 
179 "Space Defense" (9 March 1997) online: Federation of American Scientists 
<http://www.fas.orglspp/military/program/asatloverview.htm> (accessed 1 July 2007). 
180 "Space Security Index 2006", supra note 18 at 425. 
181 Marc Kaufman & Dafna Linzer, "China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test" The Washington Post 
(19 January 2007) A01, online: The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynicontent/article/2007/0l/18/AR2007011801029.html> (accessed 10 July 2007). 
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Department of Defense had reported to the D.S. Congress in 2006: "China ean eurrently 
destroy or disable satellites only by launehing a ballistie missile or spaee-Iauneh vehicle 
armed with a nuc1ear weapon.,,182 Marine General James E. Cartwright, Commander of 
D.S. Strategie Command, commented on how remarkable China's ASAT capability was, 
"What was impressive was that in three attempts, they made signifieant changes each 
time.,,183 Not only was China's ASAT eapability more advanced than the D.S. thought it 
was, its capability was more than what either the D.S. or Russia had demonstrated 
before-this was the first successful ASAT by a land-based missile ever. 184 It is no 
wonder that Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael T. Moseley, compared China' s 
ASAT shootdoWll with the DSSR's launch ofSputnik in October of 1957-when the 
DSSR demonstrated that they had were "ahead" of the D.S. in the space race. 185 
Alexander Khramchikhin, head of the analytieal department for Politieal and Military 
Analysis in Moscow, echoed the sentiments ofthese D.S. generals, noting that China's 
ASAT test shows that Beijing has more advanced space weapons than either the D.S. or 
Russia. 186 General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said ofChina's 
test, "it is a unique capacity in the world. And we need to, in a very separate 
conversation, take a look at where are we with regard to that capacity, where should we 
182 D.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report ta Congress: Military Power of the People 's Republic of 
China (2006) at 35, online: D.S. Department of Defense Publications 
<http://www.defenselink.millpubs/china.html> [D.S., 2006 Report on China] (accessed 5 July 2007). 
183 Peter Spiegel, "D.S. gauges the threat to satellites" Los Angeles Times (22 April 2007) A26. 
184 Eric Talmadge, "China ready-and able-to face D.S. in space" The Commercial Appeal (15 April 
2007) AlO. See Isenberg, supra note 5 at 1. 
185 Bill Gertz, "Pentagon details China's new military strategies" The Washington Times (25 May 2007) 
A14. 
186 Dmitry Litovkin, "China's anti-satellite weapons a waming to Russia and the D.S." Russian Press 
Digest (13 February 2007). 
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be, and ifthere is a gap, how we close it.,,187 Finally, the Secretary of the USAF noted, 
"Recent foreign testing of kinetic ASA T weapon capabilities further demonstrates an 
explicit willingness to challenge, disrupt, or destroy America's space as sets and 
capabilities. ,,188 
The Chinese had successfully employed the advice of Deng Xiaoping, the former 
de facto leader of China from the late 1970's to the early 1990's, "hide our capacities and 
bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile." lronically, this quote was found in 
the same report by the U.S. Department of Defense that noted China did not have ASAT 
capability beyond the use of a nuclear weapon. 189 
Another type of ASA T that could be characterized as a kinetic-energy ASA T, 
depending on its use, is a "parasitic" ASAT or a "piggyback satellite." These ASATs 
attack their target satellite by attaching themselves to it and then either blowing them up, 
or, alternatively, merely jamming the target satellite. China has been working on 
developing these types of ASATs. 190 
In January 2003, the USAF tested its XSS-1 0 micro satellite (Experimental Small 
Satellite), which maneuvered within 35 meters of other satellites in order to take 
187 "VS Defense Chief Troubled by Chinese Anti-Satellite Test" Washington (6 February 2007), online: 
Space Daily 
<http://www.spacewar.comireportsIUS_Defense_ChieeTroubled_By_Chinese_Anti_Satellite_Test_999.ht 
ml> (accessed 4 June 2007). 
188 V.S., FY 2008 National Defense Budget Requestfrom the Department of the Air Force Before the House 
Armed Services Committee, llOth Congo (28 February 2007) at 3 (The Honorable Michael W. Wynne & 
General T. Michael Moseley), online: House Armed Services Committee 
<http://armedservices.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml> (accessed 10 June 2007). 
189 V.S., 2006 Report on China, supra note 182 at 7. 
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pictures. 191 Rather than equipping the XSS-I 0 with a camera, a small explosive could 
easily be used to destroy a target satellite from that range. 192 In April 2005, the USAF 
launched the XSS-11, the successor to the XSS-10. The U.S. vaguely registered this 
satellite in the U.N. Registry as a "[s]pacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses 
of space technology such as weather and communications.,,193 An anonymous 
Department of Defense official, however, commented about this highly-maneuverable 
microsatellite, "XSS-10 and -11 [were] both designed for the same mission. XSS-11 can 
be used as an ASAT weapon.,,194 
Sorne have also indicated the position that the U.S. Space Shuttle is also an anti-
satellite weapon, as it "could" be used as one. 195 This is akin to saying a fork is a 
weapon, because it "could" be used as one. Nevertheless, as it has been labeled as a 
potential ASAT by numerous sources, including the former U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment,196 l will include it here. Any space-Iaunch vehicle could be used as an 
ASAT. This highlights the problem oftrying to define an ASAT, a central starting point 
for any proposed arms control agreement. 
191 Bruce M. DeBlois, et al. "Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon" (Fall2004) 29:2 International 
Seeurity 50 at 59. 
192 Ibid. 
193 "Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space" online, United Nations 
<http://www.unoosa.orgloosalosoindex.html> (accessed 10 July 2007). 
194 Elaine M. Grossman & Keith J. Costa, "Small, Experimental Satellite May Offer More than Meets the 
Eye," Inside the Pentagon (4 December 2003), online: Global Security.org 
<http://www.globalsecurity.orglorglnews/2003/031204-asat.htm> (accessed 17 June 2007). 
195 During negotiations with the U.S. in the 1970's over a potential ASAT treaty, "the Soviet Union 
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3. Directed-Energy Weapons 
A laser197 beam travels at the speed of light-300,000 km/s (186,000 miles per 
second); 198 hence, it would only take a small fraction of a second for a laser from Earth to 
reach any of the artificial satellites orbiting the Earth. Lasers have been contemplated for 
both "blinding" (perrnanently damaging) or "dazzling" (temporarily blinding) 
satellites. 199 For a laser to be an effective weapon against a satellite, the operator would 
need to keep the weapon focused on the target satellite long enough to build up sufficient 
heat.200 Focusing the laser on the target satellite, and keeping the laser on the satellite 
long enough to damage it, is not a simple feat, as satellites in Low Earth Orbit are 
traveling at 7-8 kilometers per second.201 The dangers of such ASATs, if developed, are 
substantial-as these weapons would provide "an 'aIl altitude,' 'instantaneous kill' 
capability.,,202 The V.S., Russia and China all currently have laser-based ASAT 
capabilities.203 
The largest V.S. experimental chemicallaser, the Mid-Infrared Advanced 
Chemical Laser (MlRACL), was developed as a defense against anti-ship cruise missiles. 
MlRACL is a chemicallaser that was designed to destroy its target by heating it with a 
197 "Laser" is an acronym for "Light Amplification by Simulated Emission of Radiation." Stares, supra 
note 49 at 111. 
198 DeBlois, supra note 191 at 58. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Chun, Defending Space, supra note Il at 34. 
201 Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law (Geneva, Switzerland: 
UNIDIR, 2006) at 34. 
202 U.S., Office of Technology Assessment Report, supra note 160 at 12. 
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beam ofinfrared radiation?04 In 1997, the DS tested this chemical laser against a D.S. 
satellite in orbit. The test involved two lasers, the high-power MlRACL laser and a low 
power 30-watt laser used for alignrnent. The laser hit a target 260 miles from Barth. 
Reportedly, it was the 30-watt laser that actually damaged the target satellite's sensors, 
causing concern that perhaps even commercially available lasers could be used to 
"dazzle" (temporarily disrupt) satellites?05 
The D.S. Department of Defense has recognized that China has been working on 
a ground-based laser ASAT "designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.,,206 In 
October of2006, the Director of the D.S. National Reconnaissance Office, Donald Kerr, 
reported that China had illuminated U.S. spy satellites flying over China with a ground-
based laser?07 No indication was given as to when this happened, or how many times. 
China's illumination of the D.S. satellite did not, however, materially damage its ability 
to collect information.208 According to a slideshow presentation by Colonel Rick 
Patenaude of Air Force Space Command, "In two hours offunction, an anti-satellite laser 
within the projected technical capability of China could: Destroy 12 NAVSTAR [GPS] 
satellites".209 
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Russia has worked on laser ASAT capabilities since the 1970's. Soviet lasers 
have targeted several U.S. satellites in the past, "blinding" an early-waming satellite on 
five occasions in 1975 and targeting ("painting") it again several times between 1983 and 
1984.210 The Soviets also "painted" and permanently damaged a U.S. reconnaissance 
(Keyhole) satellite in 1976?1l On 10 October 1984, the USSR also targeted the U.S. 
Space Shuttle Challenger, causing equipment to malfunction and temporarily blinding the 
crew?12 The U.S. also believed the USSR to be "conducting research and development 
in the area of space-based laser ASAT systems.,,213 
One defensive capability the U.S. is pursing that could likely be modified for use 
as an ASAT is the Airbome Laser (ABL), a pro gram begun by the USAF in 1996?14 
This laser "williocate and track missiles in the boost phase of their flight, then accurately 
point and fire the high-energy laser, destroying enemy missiles near their launch 
areas.,,215 The ABL laser is mounted on the nose of a modified 747 aircraft. Boeing's 
website notes that the first missile intercept test will take place in late 2008?16 
210 Desmond BaIl, "Assessing China's ASAT program" (14 June 2007), online: Nautilus Institute 
<http://www.nautilus.org!~rmit/forum-reports/0714s-ball/> (accessed 27 June 2007). 
2ll Ibid. 
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Required in the Conference Report for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1984 (H. Doc. 
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In 2003, the USAF listed a "Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon" as a 
"future system concept" and noted it would "be a constellation of satellites containing 
high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to 
disruptldestroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and national-Ievel command and 
control systems. It would typically be used as a non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon.,,217 
4. Jamming 
One way to temporarily disable the operational effectiveness of a satellite without 
having to destroy it is to employ electronic countermeasures against the satellite. 
"Jamming" consists of "overloading enemy receivers with strong signals,,218 Another 
electronic countermeasure is "spoofing," which consists of sending deceptive signals?19 
As of September 2004, the USAF has operated the Counter Communications 
System.220 Operated by the 76th Space Control Squadron in Colorado, this system uses 
mobile antennas to jam an adversary's access to space?21 Speaking ofthis program, 
Peter Teets, former Acting Secretary of the USAF and the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office noted, "[t]his system is designed to apply reversible effects that 
ensure that during a time ofneed, an adversary's space-based capability to threaten our 
forces is diminished. Following the time of need, those space-based capabilities can be 
217 V.S., Transformational Flight Plan, supra note 52 at D-lO. 
218 V.S., Office of Technology Assessment Report, supra note 160 at 9. 
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online: SignonSanDiego.com <signonsandiego.comlnews/military/20041 029-1531-arms-satellite-
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returned to their original state.,,222 D.S. "budget documents indicate 'first generation' 
counter satellite communications capabilities are already in place, while the 'second-
generation' capability will be built by 2011.,,223 
The D.S., Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Iraq and North Korea aIl have military 
jamming capabilities?24 For example, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Iraqi 
forces used GPS jammers in their failed attempt to jam the D.S. GPS system?25 
The capability for "jamming" satellite transmissions is not limited to a few select 
countries. In 1997, Tonga accused Indonesia ofjamming the broadcast of transmissions 
from a Hong Kong satellite (Apstar IA)?26 In July 2003, Iran "jammed" a D.S. 
/ Geostationary satellite from a location inside of Cuba.227 The satellite had been 
broadcasting D.S. government and private Persian-Ianguage television and radio 
broadcasts into Iran?28 ln 2005, Libya successfully jammed broadcasts from a couple of 
international satellites. The target of the jamming was thought to be the program Sowt 
Libya "a British- and Arab-owned commercial radio station broadcasting on human rights 
222 "Persistent Director: Interview with Peter Teets" 3: 1 Military Geospatial Technology: Online Edition 
(17 March 2005), online: Military Geospatial Technology <http://www.military-geospatial-
technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=856> (accessed 24 June 2007). 
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issues to Libya.,,229 The jamming not only jammed the signaIs ofCNN International, 
BBC World and other stations, but also disrupted U.S. military communications in the 
Mediterranean.230 
Jamming a satellite's signal does not require expensive or high-tech capability. In 
fact, Russia markets handheld GPS jammers the size of a cigarette package with the 
capability of denying access to GPS for 80 kilometers?31 GPS jammers, and designs to 
build GPS and communications jammers, are readily available for purchase on the 
Internet.232 A rather famous case oflow-technology jamming took place inside the U.S. 
in April of 1986 when "Captain Midnight" overrode an HBO broadcast with a text 
message protesting HBO's rates for satellite viewers.233 
China has had its share of intentional satellite disruptions from non-State actors. 
In 2002, the Falun Gong (a banned spiritual group or evil cult, depending on who you 
ask) not only jammed regularly programmed satellite signaIs, but took them over.234 The 
Falun Gong interrupted scheduled Chinese entertainment and educational T.V. broadcasts 
with messages promoting the Falun Gong for over an hour?35 Three years later, in 
March 2005, signaIs allegedly sent by the Falun Gong interrupted "at least eight 
television stations with anti-government messages timed to coincide with annual 
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230 Ibid. at 433-34. 
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meetings of the Chine se Communist Party.,,236 China's response was to purchase and 
develop "jam-proof' satellites-but signaIs from a supposedly ''jam-proof' satellite were 
also overridden by the Falun Gong in July 2005?37 
If the Falun Gong and "Captain Midnight" have this capability, it is reasonable to 
conclude that most States and other non-State actors (e.g., al Qaeda) could fairly easily 
obtain sorne level of satellite jamming capabilities. 
5. Ballistic Missile Dejènse 
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is closely related to ASATs in two ways. First, 
the absence of a defense against a potential adversary's ballistic missiles will keep aState 
from launching its own ballistic missiles (for fear of retaliation). If aState were to begin 
developing a space-based defense to the strategie weapons of its potential adversaries, 
they would likely feel the need to develop the means to attack this space-based missile 
defense-resulting in a sharp increase in ASA T development by aIl potential adversaries. 
Second, BMD has inherent ASAT capabilities.238 The U.S.'s former Office of 
Technology Assessment confirmed this in 1985, "even a modest BMD system would 
236 "Space Security Index 2006", supra note 18 at 434. 
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make a very capable ASAT weapon .... ,,239 This is the case even if the BMD system is 
only designed to attack an object while it is in its launch phase.240 
Sorne dispute that BMD could be used as an ASAT-noting that targeting a 
satellite requires totally different technology than targeting a ballistic missile. James 
Ob erg, a veteran of NASA mission control, noted that a space-based missile interceptor 
system that targets a missile during its boost phase "relies on chasing down its most 
visible feature: its hot rocket plume.,,241 By comparison, "satellites don't have hot rocket 
plumes, and sens ors developed to chase such plume generators (i.e., attacking missiles) 
wouldn't even see a passively orbiting satellite.,,242 
There are several responses to this argument. First, aIl satellites use rockets to 
launch them into space. If aState builds a system capable of destroying a satellite in the 
early stages of its launch towards space, such a system would be an effective ASA T-
and would control access to space. Second, the U.S.'s CUITent missile defense program is 
not merely seeking a method to attack a rocket in its boost phase, but rather "[t]he 
program is managed as one system that will explore concepts and eventually develop and 
field air, sea, ground and space systems that will intercept any range of threat in the 
239 U.S., Office of Technology Assessment Report, supra note 160 at 19. "AlI space-based and many 
ground-based BMD weapons would make excellent ASATs, even ifthey were poor strategie defenses." 
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boost, midcourse or terminal phases offlight trajectory.,,243 This type of missile defense 
affords a better chance at interception, as the missile can be subject to multiple attacks 
over the course ofits trajectory--even while it is in space.244 In fact, as Air Force 
Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, the Director of the D.S. Missile Defense 
Agency, recently stated, "[t]he system's Ground-Based Interceptors use hit-to-kill 
technologies to destroy intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile warheads in space, 
in the midcourse phase of flight. These are the only weapons we have available today to 
defeat longer-range threats once they have been launched.,,245 The missile defense 
system the D.S. is currently developing will have definite ASAT capabilities. 
Russia also has a limited ballistic missile defense program (within the confines of 
the now-deceased Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty246) that protects Moscow from an attack 
by ballistic missiles. Russia' s ABM interceptors "can c1imb to several hundred 
kilometers altitude, where its multi-megaton nuc1ear warhead could harm normal 
satellites hundreds ofkilometers away.,,247 
243 V.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at 78. The plan for a layered defense (attacking ballistic 
missiles in an phases oftheir flight) has been around for a long time. See, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, 
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B. Vulnerability to ASATs 
Of the 847 active satellites in space, 470 belong to the U.S. or its companies (or 
are listed as "international" or "multinational" and have strong ties to the U.S.).248 Of the 
U.S.'s 470 satellites, 123 are military satellites (omitting the civilian satellites, such as 
Iridium, that the U.S. military also uses).249 Major General Frank Faykes, Director of the 
USAF Budget, recently reported that the Air Force "[c]onducts space control and satellite 
operations of over 140 DoD [Department of Defense] and National Satellites". 250 
Regardless, the exact numbers of satellites, military or otherwise, the U.S. investment in 
its satellites is valued at over $50 billion dollars?51 
Russia and China have the second and third most satellites in space, with 91 and 
39 respectively.252 Given these simple numbers, it's plain to see who has the most as sets 
in space, and hence both the most to gain from space, but also the most to lose in space. 
As stated in the Space Commission Report, "[t]he U.S. is more dependent on space than 
any other nation.,,253 
"It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence oftwo and half 
millennia, that anything of great strategie importance to one belligerent, for that reason 
has to be worth attacking by others.,,254 Or, as noted inthe Space Commission Report, 
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the V.S. recognizes that the "political, economic and military value of space systems 
makes them attractive targets for state and non-state actors hostile to the Vnited States 
and its interests.,,255 
The impact from the destruction of these satellites would be tremendous-
politicaIly, economicaIly, socially and militarily. "Without space-based communications 
and precision location our military forces would degrade. This would not be the quasi-
linear degradation under fire that traditional combat elements experience, but a non-linear 
degradation--one approaching an order of magnitude reduction in capability.,,256 
Satellites, given their enormous military and economic importance, are certainly 
attractive targets-but they are only at risk inasmuch as an enemy can target them. After 
aIl, satellites move at extremely fast speeds and are far, far away. That said, satellites 
move in predictable orbits, so enemies with technical sophistication will know where a 
State's satellites are at any given time?57 As an article in China's Liberation Army Daily 
noted, "Anti-satellite weapons that can be developed at low cost and that can strike at the 
enemy's enormously expensive yet vulnerable space system will become an important 
option for the majority of medium-sized and small countries with fragile space 
technology. ,,258 
The preceding discussion of ASATs shows that at least the V.S., Russia and 
China possess a demonstrated ability to specifically target and destroy at least satellites in 
255 u.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 17. 
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Low Earth Orbit (which would include reconnaissance satellites, communications 
satellites, weather satellites and space stations). 
More conceming is the growing numbers of States that are capable of detonating 
a nuclear warhead a few hundred kilometers above ground (including North Korea, and 
likely soon, Iran)?59 With this basic capability, there is no need for the technology to 
specifically target a fast moving satellite-once they have a nuclear warhead and a rocket 
capable ofreaching a few hundred kilometers up, they don't need to specifically target 
anything to basically destroy everything in Low Earth Orbit. An attack ofthis kind, and 
from its resulting electromagnetic pulse (EMP), would have effects much greater than 
those experienced in Hawaii after the STARFISH Prime test of 1962. Societies rely on 
electronics much more in 2007 than they did in 1962-including many aspects of critical 
infrastructure-water supply, power, fuel, communications, transportation, government 
services, financial services and emergency services?60 
Though not nearly as catastrophic as a nuclear explosion in Low Earth Orbit, even 
"jamming" can have dire consequences. GPS signaIs from satellites in Medium Earth 
Orbit are highly susceptible to jamming. GPS signaIs are very weak-so weak that they 
are "regularly wiped out by natural phenomena and by other radio transmissions. And 
anyone with $50 and a soldering iron can buy parts from a radio store and make a jammer 
to destroy the GPS signal for a hundred miles.,,261 With such availability and having such 
a low price tag, the potential for use by terrorists is conceming. 
259 Iran has tested whether its ballistic missiles could be exploded by remote control while they are still in 
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c. Defending Satellites from ASATs 
There are several ways to reduce satellite vulnerabilities. Important satellite 
systems can be equipped with a variety of survivability features. For example, they can 
be hardened to prevent destruction from a distant nuc1ear attack, made resistant to 
warming from distant lasers, and provided with anti-jamming capabilities?62 The V.S. 
GPS satellites are equipped with these survivability features and several others?63 
Another way to reduce the vulnerability of satellite systems is to keep spare 
replacement satellites in orbit, so if one satellite in a satellite system is destroyed, another 
satellite would be readily available to take its place. This is also the case with the V.S. 's 
GPS satellites?64 
One method of countering an ASAT attack is to have the ability to maneuver the 
targeted satellite out of the path of the ASAT. To be effective, the maneuver would have 
to take place after the ASAT had been launched, hence, a solid alerting system would 
have to be operational in order to wam of a pending attack in time for a successful 
evasion via a maneuver operation.265 Besides needing advance waming, satellites are 
also constrained by how much fuel they have available?66 
Yet another way to prote ct a satellite would be to give it "stealth" capabilities, 
much like the V.S. provides for its B-2 Stealth Bomber and the V.S. Navy provides its 
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Virginia Class Submarine and will provide its planned Littoral Combat Ship?67 Stealth 
minimizes energy reflection and maximizes energy absorption, making the satellite 
difficult to detect with radar, infrared, visual or acoustic sensors?68 
Another contemplated method for protecting an important satellite is to have 
"bodyguard" satellites follow the protected satellite closely. The "bodyguard" satellite 
could then take.action to negate any threat it might detect.269 
This is but a sampling of the actions that can be taken by States to protect their 
satellites from ASAT attacks. These protective measures, however, are far from adequate 
guarantees for satellite safety. Stealth will not prote ct against a nearby nuclear 
detonation, nor will it prevent a satellite from being unintentionally struck by a piece of 
space debris. Maneuvering out of the path of an incoming ASAT may work against sorne 
ASAT threats, but this capability cornes at the expense ofburning up limited fuel. Anti-
jamming technology will work against sorne jamming technologies, but as the Falun 
Gong demonstrated to China, the technology for jamming satellites will also get more 
effective. Anti-jamming measures will also be of no value in defending against non-
jamming ASAT capabilities. Finally, hardening a satellite can only provide protection 
against distant nuclear blasts or tiny fragments of debris. AlI methods of physically 
protecting satellites have serious limitations. 
Another measure of protection that could, arguably, be at least as effective as aIl 
of the above-mentioned "survivability" measures, would be to adopt an international 
267 V.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at 78. 
268 Adolfo J. Femandez, "Military Role in Space Control: A Primer" (Cong. Research Service Report for 
Congress,23 September 2004) at CRS-12, online: Federation of American Scientists 
<http://www.fas.org/man/crsIRL32602.pdf> (accessed 27 June 2007). 
269 Ibid. at CRS-13. 
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agreement limiting ASATs. Chapter Six of this thesis will discuss how such a treaty is 
desirable. 
Having discussed CUITent and planned ASA T capabilities, it is apparent that 
satellites are vulnerable to several kinds of attack. This is so, is spite of the limited 
"survivability" features that can be incorporated into satellites. That said, satellites, are 
only vulnerable if a State or other organization has the intent to employ them. Hence, it 
is important to consider, as best as can be discemed, the intentions ofthose who could 
carry out an ASA T attack. 
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Chapter Three: Future Intentions to Use ASATs 
A. U.S. Intentions to Use ASAT Weapons 
1. Military Doctrine 
In 2001, a committee was appointed in the D.S. to access space activities in 
support ofD.S. national security.270 The committee, known as the "Space Commission," 
was made up of retired generals and congressmen, and was chaired by Donald H. 
Rumsfeld until his appointment as the Secretary of Defense. The conclusions of the 
Space Commission have been important to U.S. military doctrine regarding the use of 
space. The Space Commission Report highlighted the growing D.S. dependence on space 
and the potential that an adversary would attack D.S. space systems-referring to a 
potential "Space Pearl Harbor.,,271 One specifically identified threat was China-citing a 
Chinese news agency report claiming, "China's military is developing methods and 
strategies for defeating the D.S. military in a high-tech and space-based future war.,,272 
As seen from China's January 2007 ASAT test, this report was accurate. 
The Space Commission Report fatalistically noted, "every medium-air, land and 
sea-has se en conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. ,,273 The report 
noted that the D.S. would need to be able to deter and defend against attacks against its 
space assets?74 The report concluded that "superior space capabilities" were required, 
270 V.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at vii. 
271 Ibid. at viii. 
272 Ibid. at 22. 
273 Ibid. at 100. "Space is a domain-like the air, land, sea, and cyberspace-within which military 
operations take place." V.S., Space Operations, supra note 79 at 3. "Future warfare will include war in 
space and cyberspace." Gray, supra note 254 at 308. 
274 V.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 100. 
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and suggested five measures to transform the U.S. space program: (1) recognize U.S. 
space interests as vital to national security; (2) re-arrange the Department of Defense to 
me et future national-security space needs; (3) ensure the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of Central Intelligence work closely together on national space security 
programs; (4) develop the means to deter and defend against attacks on us. assets in 
space; and, (5) invest in space science and technology?75 
In November 2003, the USAF published its Transformational Flight Plan-its 
plan to transform the Air Force from an industrial age Air Force to an information age 
Air Force, and from an Air Force focused on the Cold War, to one prepared for the post-
Cold War period?76 In regards to space, it large1y adopted the Space Commission Report 
from two years earlier, and specifically noted it was "[i]mplementing the changes 
recommended" by the Space Commission Report?77 The Transformational Flight Plan 
recognized the risks of future adversaries attacking U.S. space assets278 and adopted the 
conclusion that the U.S. had to "develop the means both to deter and to defend against 
hostile acts in and from space.,,279 
The Transformational Flight Plan asserted that it was essential to deny an 
adversary access to space services-to prevent them from using space "in the same way 
the United States and its allies can.,,280 The plan went on to stress the need for 
275 Ibid. at 99-100. 
276 U.S., Transformational Flight Plan, supra note 52 at i. 
277 Ibid. at iv. 
278 Ibid. at 60. 
279 Ibid. at 39. 
280 Ibid. at 61. 
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"offensive counterspace systems" capable of "negating adversarial space capabilities 
from low earth up to geosynchronous orbits.,,281 It stressed, however, that "when 
practical" the D.S. would deny "adversary access to space on a temporary and reversible 
basis.,,282 Rence, the D.S.'s preferred method of "offensive counterspace" will not be the 
permanent destruction of another State's satellites. This stance found its way into the 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called for only reversible ASAT capabilities, 
like jamming, rather than kinetic-based ASATs?83 
The Transformational Flight Plan noted the "Air Force Vision" challenged the 
Air Force to "maintain global air and space power supremacy".284 The plan noted, 
"Space superiority combines the following three capabilities: protect space assets, deny 
adversaries' access to space, and quickly launch vehicles and operate payloads into space 
to quickly replace space as sets that fail or are damagedldestroyed.,,285 A 2006 DSAF 
doctrine document, entitled, Space Operations defined "space superiority" as "[t]he 
degree of dominance in space of one force over another that permits the conduct of 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Michael Bruno, "Senator: D.S. Offensive Space Abilities a Must" (30 January 2007) Aerospace Daily & 
Defense Report, online: "Aviation Week 
<http://www.aviationweek.comlaw / generic/story _ channel.j sp ?channel=space&id=newsIKYLO 1307 .xml> 
(accessed 10 June 2007). Despite Arizona Senator Jon Kyl's comments, my review of the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review found no reference to "anti-satellite weapons" or "ASATs" and only a vague 
reference that "[ s ]urvivability of space capabilities will be assured by improving space situational 
awareness and protection, and through other space control measures." D.S., Department of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (6 February 2006) at 56, online: D.S. Department of Defense 
Publications <http://www.defenselink.millpubs/> (accessed 9 July 2007). Perhaps these "other space 
control measures" were further spelled out in related documents Senator KyI reviewed. 
284 D.S., Transformational Flight Plan, supra note 52 at 79. 
285 Ibid. at CII-12 [emphasis added]. 
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operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space and special operations forces 
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.,,286 
Space Operations also de scribes the four space mission areas. One ofthese 
mission areas includes "space control" which includes using ASATs to deny an adversary 
the ability to effectively use space?87 A companion Air Force document, entitled 
Counterspace Operations discusses the "ways and means by which the Air Force 
achieves and maintains space superiority.,,288 Offensive counterspace operations target 
an adversary's space systems and seek to "deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
adversary space capabilities"-known as the "five D'S.,,289 To achieve these effeets, it is 
not always neeessary to target an adversary's satellite at aIl. It is often equally effective 
to attack an adversary's terrestrial system (the receiver) or the signal between the satellite 
and the receiver?90 
2. National Space Policy 
On 31 August 2006, D.S. President George W. Bush, issued a new national space 
poHey (2006 National Space Policy),291 replacing the 1996 national spaee poliey (1996 
National Space Policy)?92 Several provisions ofboth the old and new policies express 
286 U.S., Space Operations, supra note 79 at 55 [emphasis added]. 
287 The other three space mission areas include (1) space support; (2) space force enhancement; and (3) 
space force application. Ibid. at 4-5. 
288 U.S., Counterspace Operations, supra note 130 at 1. 
289 Ibid. at 2. 
290 Ibid. at 3. 
291 U.S., 2006 National Space Policy, supra note 126. 
292 U.S., u.s. National Space PoUcy, Presidential Decision Directive-49 (14 September 1996)[U.S., 1996 
National Space PoUcy]. 
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the U.S. intention to use ASATs in certain circumstances-though neither policy ever 
mentions the terms "anti-satellite weapon" or "ASAT." 
The 2006 National Space Polie y reaffirmed the U.S.'s long-standing position that 
the peaceful use of outer space agreed to in the Outer Space Treaty inc1udes military, 
though "non-aggressive," uses of space. Specifically it asserted, "'peaceful purposes' 
allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests;,,293 
More aggressively, it went on to note, "the United States will ... deny, ifnecessary, 
adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.,,294 On the 
same note of denying the use of space to adversaries, the 2006 National Space Policy 
provided that the U.S. Secretary of Defense would, "[d]evelop capabilities, plans, and 
options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action 
to adversaries:,,295 Finally, the 2006 National Space Polie y mandated, "the Secretary of 
Defense shaH: Maintain the capabilities to execute the space support, force enhancement, 
space control, andforce application missions;,,296 
293 U.S., 2006 National Space PoUcy, supra note 126 at 1 [emphasis added]. This is almost exactly the 
same language as used in the 1996 National Space PoUcy, "'[p]eaceful purposes' allow defense and 
intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals." U.S., 1996 National Space 
PoUcy, supra note 292 at 1 [emphasis added]. . 
294 U.S., 2006 National Space PoUcy, supra note 126 at 1-2. Again, this is almost no different than the 
1996 National Space PoUcy, which provided, "[n]ational security space activities shall contribute to U.S. 
national security by: ... (d) countering, ifnecessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes;" 
U.S., 1996 National Space PoUcy, supra note 292 at 3. 
295 U.S., 2006 National Space PoUcy, supra note 126 at 4 [emphasis added]. This provision was also 
almost identical to President Clinton's 1996 National Space PoUcy, which provided, "the United States will 
develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if 
directed, deny suchfreedom of action to adversaries." U.S., 1996 National Space Policy, supra note 292 at 
4. 
296 U.S., 2006 National Space Policy, supra note 126 at 4 [emphasis added]. Yet again, the 1996 National 
SpacePolicy used almost identicallanguage to say the exact same thing, "[the Department of Defense] 
shaH maintain the capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space 
control, and force application." U.S., 1996 National Space Policy, supra note 292 at 4. 
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Not surprisingly, the abrasive tone used throughout the 2006 National Space 
Policy garnered much criticism?97 This language cornes across as offensive in light of 
the more diplomatic words used in the Outer Space Treaty-which used the word 
"peace" and "peaceful" eleven different times to de scribe the use of space. Other phrases 
that stand out strongly in the Outer Space Treaty include "international cooperation" and 
"mutual assistance." The 2006 National Space Policy also uses the words "peaceful" and 
stresses that the U.S. "is commirted to the exploration and use of outer space by aIl 
nations for peaceful purposes",298 but unfortunately, this language gets lost amid the 
overall tone of the policy, which has been aptly described as "belligerent and bellicose, 
and reminiscent of a schoolyard buIly.,,299 Andrew Brookes, an aerospace analyst at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted, "[t]he language they [the U.S.] use is 
very belligerent in tone. The U.S. is seeking to dominate space, and this frightens 
others. ,,300 Viewed in context of the military doctrine-couched in terms of "space 
superiority," "dominance," "control," and "denial," it is no wonder that the rest of the 
world (and even U.S. citizens) finds the U.S. rhetoric offensive. As former U.S. Vice-
President Al Gore commented, "[i]t is deeply disturbing that the administration so 
frequently uses the word dominance to describe it strategic goals.,,301 
297 "Bush's space policy pursues hegemony in space and poses a significant security risk to China that 
cannot be left unaddressed." Bao Shixiu, "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space" (Winter 2007) China 
Security 2, 2. 
298 V.S., 2006 National Space Policy, supra note 126 at 1. 
299 Louis Friedman, "Belligerent Tone Mars V.S. Administration Space Policy" The Planetary Society (28 
October 2006), online: The Planetary Society 
<http://www.planetary.org/aboutlexecutive_director/20061023.html> (accessed 29 May 2007). 
300 Mark Holmes, "MilSpace 2007: Military Forces Looking Forward Toward Space" Satellite News (12 
March 2007). 
301 Al Gore, The Assault on Reason (New York: Penguin Press, 2007) at 158. 
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The fact is the 2006 National Space PoUcy merely reiterated the 1996 National 
Space Policy. It was less diplomatie, but it did not change a long-maintained D.S. policy, 
amounting to an assertion that it will defend its as sets in space, and in the event of 
hostilities, may use force (ASATs) against enemy space assets. 
3. Withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
The withdrawal by the D.S. from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty paved the 
way for the D.S. to develop a ballistic-missile defense program-incIuding one in space 
ifit so desires. The D.S. withdrawal from this agreement was the first withdrawal by any 
nation from an arms control agreement since World War 11.302 
4. Funding 
No ASAT programs are specifically funded in the U.S. Defense Budget for FY 
2008 (ending September 2008)-that is to say, no programs are listed as ASAT systems. 
That said, the DSAF requested a total of $346.9 million for "Space Control" and 
"Counterspace Systems." Specifically, it requested $233.1 million for the operation and 
maintenance ofits "Space Control Systems,,,303 $37.6 million for research and 
development of "Space Control Technology,,,304 $53.4 million for research and 
development of "Counterspace Systems,,,305 and $22.8 million for "Counterspace 
302 Mark Bromley, "Implications of VS Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and Missile Defence" 
(Presentation delivered at Treaties Day School, King's College, London, 16 February 2002), online: British 
American Security Information Council <http://www.basicint.org/nuclearINMDIMBpresentation-
0202.htm> (accessed 29 May 2007). 
303 V.S., Department of Defense, Operation and Maintenance Programs, (February 2007) at 34, online: 
V.S. Department of Defense Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008 
<http://www.defenselinkmil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2008 _ 0 l.pdt> (accessed 25 June 2007). 
304 V.S., Department of Defense, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Programs, (February 2007) at 
F-4, online: V.S. Department of Defense Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudgetlfy2008/fy2008Jl.pdt> (accessed 25 June 2007). 
305 Ibid. at F-5. 
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System" procurement pfograms.306 This combined expenditure of $346.9 million is a 
substantial amount and demonstrates the U.S. intent to continue to pursue ASAT 
development. 
This amount does not include what is likely the most significant ASAT system of 
alI-the $8.8 billion dollars requested for various programs tied to missile defense in FY 
2008.307 If any of this is for space-based BMD, the U.S. is engaged in the most extensive 
and expensive ASA T capability of aIl time. 
5. Vote against PAROS Resolution 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has passed a resolution entitled, 
"Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" (PAROS) every year since 1981.308 This 
resolution: 
Calls upon aIl States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to 
contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and 
of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions 
contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest 
of maintaining international peace and security and promoting 
international cooperation;309 
The United States was the sole nation to vote against this resolution, which, in 
2006, passed by a vote of 178-1-1 (Israel was the one abstention).310 Incidentally, the 
306 V.S., Department of Defense, Procurement Programs, (February 2007) at F-20, online: V.S. 
Department of Defense Defense Budget Materials: FY 2008 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudgetlfy2008/fy2008 j> l.pdt> (accessed 25 June 2007). 
307 V.S., Costs by Weapon System, supra note 37 at Hi. 
308 "Index ofOnline General Assembly Resolutions Relating to Outer Space: Recorded Votes on 
Resolutions," online: Vnited Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
<http://www.unoosa.orgloosa/SpaceLaw/gares/gavotes.htrnl#ARES_61_111> ["GA Resolution Votes"] 
(accessed 9 July 2007). 
309 Prevention of an arms race in outer space, GA Res. 61/51, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., UN Doc. 
AlRes/61/58 (2006) at para. 4. 
310 Israel abstained from the vote, aIl other nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of 13 minor 
nations that were absent. "GA Resolution Votes", supra note 308. 
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V.S. only voted against PAROS in 2005 and 2006.311 In aIl prior years from 1981 
through 2004, the V.S. had abstained from the vote.312 PAROS, as a General Assembly 
resolution, does not bind (or legally obligate in any way) either the V.S. or even the 
States that voted in its favor. 313 Nevertheless, the recent V.S. vote against PAROS 
reflects a V.S. position that is steering towards increased militarization of outer space, 
most notably through a space-based missile defense pro gram, but potentially also 
signaling an increased willingness to use ASATs.314 As noted in the Space Commission 
Report after commenting on the yearly General Assembly PAROS resolution, "[t]he V.S. 
should seek to preserve the space weapons regime established by the Outer Space Treaty, 
particularly the traditional interpretation of the Treaty's 'peaceful purposes' language to 
mean that both self-defense and non-aggressive military use of space are allowed.,,315 
In February 2007, V.S. Ambassador Christina Rocca told the V.N. Conference on 
Disarmament that the arms race in space "does not exist.,,316 She noted the difficulties 
encountered during prior attempts at ASAT arms control in defining "space weapon" and 
noted, "What is often meant is whatever the V.S. may be exploring in terms ofballistic 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Charter of the United Nations, art. 10 (noting "[t]he General Assembly ... may make recommendations." 
See also Jan Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 663 
n.82 (noting "resolutions ... are recommendations creating prima facie no lega1 obligations"). 
314 Rebecca Johnson, "Enhanced Participation and Politicking: Report on the 2005 UN First Committee" 
(Winter 2005) 81 Disarmament Diplomacy, online: The Acronym Institute 
<http://www.acronym.org.uk/ddldd81181unfc.htm> (accessed 24 June 2007). 
315 U.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 37. 
316 UN Conference on Disarmament, "Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador 
Christina Rocca, U.S. Permanent Representative: Prevention of an Arros Race in Outer Space" (13 
February 2007), online: Reaching Critica1 Will 
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missile defenses in space, but not weapons on the ground that would atiack satellites in 
space.,,317 This highlights that perhaps most of the U.S. reluctance to PAROS is 
indicative of its planned missile defense-which will, as previously discussed, be a 
particularly effective ASAT, and also be partly based in space. 
The U.S. intent to use ASATs is c1ear when you consider the combination ofits 
military doctrine, national space policy, funding for "Space Control," "Counterspace 
Systems," and BMD and also its recent withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and the U.S. vote against PAROS. With U.S. ASAT intentions established, it's 
time to review those of other States, most notably, China' s intentions to use ASATs. 
B. Chinese Intentions to Use ASAT Weapons 
1. Declared Intention not to Use ASATs 
China' s words and actions conflict with each other over its future intentions to use 
ASATs. On the one hand, China has long sought for an international agreement to 
prohibit using ASATs. In 2002, China joined with Russia in presenting a draft 
international agreement to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament that would 
prevent the deployment of weapons in space and also prevent the threat or use of force 
against space objects.318 This proposaI notes, "[f]or the benefit ofmankind, outer space 
shaH be used for peaceful purposes, and it shaH never be aHowed to become a sphere of 
317 Ibid. at 2. 
318 Letter Dated 27 June 2002from the permanent representative of the People's Republic of China and the 
permanent representative of the Russian Federation ta the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the conference transmitting the Chinese, English and Russian texts of a working 
paper entitled "Possible Elementsfor a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention and Use 
of Force Against Outer Space abjects, UN Doc. CD 1679 (28 June 2002) [Proposed Chinese/Russian 
Space Weapons & ASAT Treaty]. 
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military confrontation.,,319 The proposed treaty would obligate States "[n]ot to place in 
orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds ofweapons" and pre vents the 
stationing of weapons of any kind on celestial bodies or anywhere in space.320 Regarding 
ASAT use, the agreement merely provides that States may not "resort to the threat or use 
of force against outer space objects.,,321 Of course, this aIl seems rather redundant to 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which already prohibits the threat and use of force. The 
only new provision of the proposed agreement is the part that expands the prohibition of 
weaponsJn space to "any kinds of weapons." 
Another verbal indication from China that it was against ASA T use was its 
corollary to the 2006 National Space PoUcy. Only days after the U.S. issued the 2006 
National Space PoUcy, China released a document entitled, "China's Space Activities in 
2006.,,322 China's policy mentioned absolutely nothing about their military space 
programs-in stark contrast to the U.S.'s 2006 National Space PoUcy, which as 
previously discussed, sounded warlike. As noted by the U.S. Department of Defense, 
China's space policy "remains silent on the military applications ofChina's space 
programs and counter space activities." 323 
319 Ibid. art. II. 
320 Ibid. art. III [emphasis added]. 
321 Ibid. art. III. 
322 China, White Paper, supra note 128. 
323 U.S., 2007 Report on China 's Military Power, supra note 127 at 1. 
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Even following its recent ASAT test on Il January 2007, China's Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao noted China was still committed to the "peaceful 
development of outer space.,,324 
2. ASAT Test & Military Modernization 
China's actions, however, do not resemble its verbal commitment to the peaceful 
use of outer space and its desire for an international agreement banning the use of 
ASATs. China, says, "let's agree not to use ASATs," but its recent ASAT test in January 
of2007 was the first use of an ASAT in space in over 20 years (since the D.So's ALMV 
ASAT in 1985). 
AIso, China has recently undertaken an extensive effort to modernize its military. 
China claims its military budget for 2007 is approximately $45 billion,325 twice what it 
claimed it had budgeted for its military in 2003 ($22.3 billion).326 The D.S. estimates, 
however, that China is spending substantially more-between $85 to $125 billion in 
2007.327 China's military modernization includes a variety of missiles that have 
precision-strike capability (involving missiles of all ranges and launched from the air, 
land and sea),328 a variety of ASAT programs(discussed earlier), cyber-space warfare 
capabilities, advanced mines, submarines, and fighter aircraft.329 
3. Preparations for Attack on Taiwan or Elsewhere 
324 "China confmns satellite downed" BBC News (23 January 2007), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6289519.stm> (accessed 14 June 2007). 
325 D.S., 2007 Report on China's Military Power, supra note 127 at 25. 
326 Ibid. at 26. 
327 Ibid. at 25. 
328 Ibid. at 17. 
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When viewed in the context ofChina's recent military m~demization program, 
the Chine se ASA T test may be an indication of Chinese preparations for an attack on 
Taiwan. "China's space activities and capabilities, including anti-satellite programs, 
have significant implications for anti-access/area denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies 
and beyond.,,330 Defense Department consultant, Michael Pillsbury, wams that over the 
past six years, three Chinese Army Colonels have written books advocating the use of 
ASAT weapons against U.S. satellites as part of a surprise attack: 
What they are doing in their books is saying that if China faces a hostile 
United States in the future, we Chinese may need to have sorne way to 
deter the United States from either attacking us, or coming to the defense 
of Taiwan. If we Chinese ever face that situation, one good way to deter 
the United States-they use the term 'bring America to its knees'-is to 
have a 'shock attack,' or a 'shock and awe' attack to borrow a term we 
[Americans] used during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, on U.S.-based 
satellites.331 
Another report to the U.S. Congress noted that Chine se "officiaIs and scholars 
have been waming that 2007 is a critical year with potential crises in the T~iwan Strait, 
citing their concems about perceived pro-independence moves by Taiw~'s president.,,332 
That said, U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that it will take China until the end of the 
decade to prepare its modem force to defeat a moderate-sized adversary. 333 
Another recent indication that China is preparing for a future conflict with the 
U.S. (or waming it to stay out a conflict over Taiwan) is the surfacing of a Chinese attack 
330 Ibid. at 20. 
331 Deborah Tate, "Defense Expert Issues Warning on China's Anti-Satellite Efforts" Voice of America 
News (30 March 2007) online: Voice of America < http://www.voanews.comlenglish/archive/2007-
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submarine within firing distance of a U.S. carrier battle group.334 On 26 October 2006, a 
Chinese submarine, equipped with Russian-made wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship 
cruise missiles, shadowed a U.S. carrier and surfaced within five miles-within firing 
range ofits torpedoes and missiles.335 
China' s military modemization is geared towards "prosecuting a range of military 
operations in Asia-well beyond Taiwan.,,336 Rence, it is possible that China is 
preparing for conflict much farther away than Taiwan. 
The possibilities for potential atlacks include one against a CUITent ally-Russia. 
In October of2006, China conducted a 10-day troop exercise in a couple ofmilitary 
districts bordering Russia. The exercises were characterized as "in depth offensive 
operations in mountainous areas and on the plains" and were viewed as preparations for 
an offensive war against Russia or Kazakhstan.337 China's ASAT test in January 2007 
could be a warning to Russia as well as to the U.S., as Russia aiso has a large number of 
space assets. That said, Russia and China have extensive military connections. In fact, 
Russia and China plan on conducting eight cooperative military activities in 2007.338 
Russia is also China's primary provider ofmilitary as sets "selling it advanced fighter 
aircraft, missile systems, submarines, and destroyers. ,,339 
334 Bill Gertz, "China sub stalked U.S. fleet" The Washington Times (13 November 2006), online: The 
Washington Times <http://washingtontimes.comlnationaV20061113-121539-3317r.htm> (accessed 14 June 
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The Assembly of the Western European Union recently characterized Russia and 
China as "cultivating a close relationship" and having an "alliance of convenience.,,340 
Following the recent Chinese ASAT test, rather than condemning China, Russia first 
questioned the reliability ofU.S. intelligence on the ASAT, and then blamed the U.S. 
plans for space weapons as the reason for the test.341 
c. Russian Intentions to Use ASAT Weapons 
1. ProposaIs to Ban Al! Space Weaponry 
In 1978 and 1979, the USSRand the U.S. made several attempts to negotiate an 
international agreement limiting ASATs.342 Discussions included the possibility of a 
complete prohibition of aIl ASAT weapons (first proposed by U.S. negotiators), a 
moratorium on the testing of ASATs and alternatively a "noninterference" agreement and 
the creation of "rules of the road" (e.g., an agreement to stay a certain distance from each 
other's satellites).343 The USSR also expressed concerns with the potential use of the 
U.S. Space Shuttle as an ASAT.344 ~he USSR was willing to discuss a moratorium on 
testing, but not the dismantling oftheir CUITent co-orbital ASATs (which would have left 
the USSR with the only operational ASAT system).345 One proposaI by the US SR also 
340 Assembly ofWestem European Union, "Weapons in Space: Part II'', Document 1966, para. 46, 53rd 
session, 6 June 2007. 
341 Theresa Hitchens, "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From 'War ofWords' to Cold War in Space?" 
(Winter 2007) China Security 12 at 21, online: Space Debate.org 
<http://www.wsichina.org/%5Ccs5_2.pdt> (accessed 26 June 2007). 
342 Stares, supra note 49 at 196. 
343 Ibid. at 197. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
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sought only to restrict the use of ASATs against each other's satellites.346 ASAT 
negotiations came to an end, however, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 
1979?47 
In August 1981, the USSR presented the United Nations General Assembly a 
proposed "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in 
Outer Space. ,,348 This proposed treaty prevented the stationing in orbit of "weapons of 
any kind" but included a provision that was seen as allowing the use of ASATs against a 
space object that was carrying a weapon of any kind.349 This was especially problematic 
as "weapon" was not defined in the proposal-Ieaving open such basic questions as 
whether the self-destruct apparatus on the Space Shuttle made it a weapon or if satellites 
that were part of a "weapon system" were weapons, even though they were not the part of 
the system that deployed the munitions?50 The proposaI also did not ban the testing or 
development of ASATs, just their use against the satellites of other States that did not 
carry weapons?51 Rebecca Strode concluded that the USSR's proposed treaty was not an 
attempt to preclude ASAT warfare, but rather "suggests that the Soviet Union is 
committed to refining its own ASA T systems and is incorporating offensive ASAT 
operations into its overall strategic doctrine.,,352 
346 Ibid. at 198. 
347 Ibid. at 199. 
348 Rebecca V. Stode, "Commentary on the Soviet Draft Space Treaty of 1981" in Colin S. Gray, American 
Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: Abt 
Books, 1982) at 85. 
349 Ibid. at 85,88, and 116. 
350 Ibid. at 87. 
351 Ibid. at 116. 
352 Ibid. at 90. 
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2. Moratorium 
Sorne would cite the USSR's 1983 moratorium on testing ASATs as evidence of 
its derision against ASAT use. Specifically, in 1983, just after it completed testing its co-
orbital ASAT system the President of the USSR announced that the USSR would impose 
a "moratorium on such launching for the entire period during which other countries, 
inc1uding the United States, will refrain from stationing in outer space anti-satellite 
systems of any type.,,353 Notably, however, this announcement also came just after U.S. 
President, Ronald Reagan, had announced the "Star Wars" BMD pro gram and also right 
before the U.S. was to begin testing ofits ALMV ASAT.354 Hence, though the 
announcement of a moratorium on ASAT testing may have looked like Soviet 
commitment to protecting the sanctuary of space, the moratorium was likely an attempt to 
maintain the Soviet advantage by stifling the U.S. attempt at parity.355 
Ulterior motives aside, the moratorium, as a "unilateral dec1aration," legally 
bound Russia to its terms. In the Nuc/ear Tests case, the International Court of Justice 
held that the dec1arations by French govemmental officiaIs, inc1uding the French 
President and Foreign Minister, announcing that France had finished atmospheric nuc1ear 
testing bound it to stop conducting nuc1ear tests in the atmosphere.356 The court noted, 
"interested States may take cognizance of unilateral dec1arations and place confidence in 
353 Laura Grego, "A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs" n. Il, online: Union ofConcemed 
Scientists <http://www.ucsusa.orglglobal_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html> 
(accessed 28 June 2007). See, U.S., Policy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 13. 
354 Grego, supra note 353. 
355 V.S., Policy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 14. 
356 Nuc/ear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] 1.c.J. Rep. 253 at 269. 
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them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected.,,357 
Likewise, the USSR's moratorium, though only a "unilateral declaration" is binding on 
Russia, and may be relied on by other States. 
3. Proposed Treaty in 2002 
Though aIl of the above actions by Russia (or the former USSR) might be viewed 
with skepticism, the treaty itjointly proposed with China to the U.N. Conference of 
Disarmament in 2002358 seems substantially more sincere. If nothing else, it 
demonstrates Russia' s willingness to retum to the negotiating table in an attempt to find a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of ASATs. Perhaps this treaty is, like the earlier 
moratorium, a response to plans for a U.S. missile defense system that plans, in part, to 
have space-based defenses. This proposed treaty, unlike the one Russia proposed in 
1981, completely bans the threat or use of ASATs (though once again, it leaves open 
their testing and development).359 
Russian officiaIs have also pledged that they would not be the first to station 
ASATs in space.360 Russia has not conducted an ASAT test since 1982 when it 
completed testing its co-orbital ASAT system. This restraint, viewed in concert with its 
efforts since 1981 to partially limit the use of ASATs is certainly not indicative that 
Russia is involved in a space weapons race. That said, Russia has not remained silent on 
the effects of such a race. 
357 Ibid. at 268. 
358 Proposed Chinese/Russian Space Weapons & ASAT Treaty, supra note 318. 
359 Ibid, art. III. 
360 D.S., Policy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 14. This pledge was repeated in 2007. 
"Assembly urges common stance on weapons in space" (6 June 2007), online: Assembly of the WEU 
<http://www.assembly-weu.orglenlpresse/ep/2007 /27-2007 .php> (accessed 28 June 2007). 
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4. Russia's Reaction to Us. BMD 
The D.S. BMD pro gram has caused considerable consternation in Russia. In 
February 2007, Russian President Putin, warned: 
[I]t is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilizing high-
te ch weapons. Needless to say, this refers to measures to prevent new 
areas of confrontation, especially in outer space .... In Russia's opinion, 
the militarization of outer space could have predictable consequences for 
the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning 
of a nuclear era?61 
Recently, D.S. plans to build BMD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic 
brought threats from Russia that it would point its missiles at Europe?62 More than 
rhetoric, Russia hasbeen developing ballistic missiles that it touts as able to penetrate 
ballistic missile defense systems. In May 2007, Russia announced a successful test of the 
RS-24-an intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple warheads.363 In June 2007, 
Russia successfully tested a sea-based intercontinental ballistic missile that had up to 10 
warheads each capable of attacking separate targets.364 Russia boasts that both missiles 
can penetrate BMD systems.365 
Even though Russia has not visibly taken part in an ASAT race for sorne time, it 
has been clear on its positions against both D.S. weapons in space and also D.S. plans for 
BMD. Russia is not aState that should be ignored. 
361 UN Conference on Disannament, "Statement to the Conference on Disannament by Ambassador Valery 
Loshchinin" (13 February 2007), online: Reaching Critical Will 
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.orgipolitical/cdlspeeches07/1 sessionlfeb 13Russia.pdf> [Statement of 
Russian Ambassador on PAROS] (accessed 28 June 2007) (quoting Russian President Vladimir Putin). 
362 Bronwen Maddox, "US wrong on anns control treaties" The Dominion Post (4 July 2007) B5. 
363 "Russia Tests Missile: Successfullaunch from nuclear submarine" The Montreal Gazette (29 July 2007) 
A19. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
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D. Intentions of Terrorists to Use ASATs 
There have been no terrorist attacks against space assets to date. That said, back 
in 2001, the US. Space Commission recognized the potential for terrorists to threaten 
vulnerable US. space systems.366 The concern remains valid today as noted in a report 
submitted to the Assembly of the Western European Union, "[sJome sufficiently highly 
motivated mafia or terrorist cells have enough financial resources to do real damage to a 
state' s space capability.,,367 
U.S. Senator Jon KyI warned ofhow easy it would be for al Qaeda to launch a 
nuc1ear warhead into the atmosphere from one of the eighty or so freighters it owns.368 
Such an attack would, no doubt, cause much more damage today than project STARFISH 
Prime caused back in 1962-both to the electronic infrastructure on the ground and to 
satellites in Low Earth Orbit (which by far outnumber the satellites in Low Earth Orbit 
back in 1962)?69 
The fear ofterrorist use of either ballistic missiles or ASATs is in large part the 
reasoning behind the lack of confidence in an anti-ballistic missile treaty. A terrorist 
organization is not likely to be deterred by "mutually assured destruction." If you can't 
deter them, you need to be able to stop them. 
The use of ASATs by terrorists seems far less likely than use by the US., China 
or Russia. All of these States have demonstrated substantial ability and indicated 
366 U.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 24. 
367 Assembly ofWestem European Union, "Weapons in Space: Part II'', Document 1966, para. 100, 53rd 
session, 6 June 2007. 
368 Independent Working Group, supra note 134 at 10. 
369 Ibid. at 9. 
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dangerous intent. This being the case, the next Chapter of this thesis will discuss the 
various legal implications of the use of ASATs. The Chapter will begin with an analysis 
of the laws relating to the use of force in general, inc1uding the right of self-defense, then 
progress through relevant provisions of the laws of armed conflict. Then it will address 
the implications of the weaponization of outer space and end with a discussion of efforts 
at non-proliferation that relate to outer space activities. 
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Chapter Four: War in Space 
A. The Use of Force is Illegal except in Self-Defense or as Authorized by the 
Security Council 
1. Outlawing Bath the Use and the Threat of Using Force 
Following World War l international treaties were adopted that outlawed war.370 
Both the Covenant of the League ofNations371 (never ratified by the U.S.) and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928372 (still in effect) outlawed war. Though these treaties did 
not prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, Italy from invading Abyssinia in 
1935 or Germany from invading Poland in 1939,373 they did, however, firmly establish in 
internationallaw that the threat of or use of force against another nation was unlawful. 
For violations ofthis legal principle, many of the instigators ofWorld War II were 
370 Customary internationallaw, even prior to WWI already prohibited war and provided for the exception 
ofself-defense. Yoram Dinstein, War Aggression and Self-De/ence, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) at 181-82. 
371 Covenant o/the League o/Nations [Treaty o/Versailles], 28 June 1919,2 Bevans 43. Several 
provisions of the Covenant o/the League o/Nations respect the prevention ofwar. Most notably, the 
preamble provides, that the purpose of the treaty was to "promote international co-operation and to achieve 
international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war .... " Also "[t]he 
Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence ofall Members of the League." Art. X. 
372 "The High Contracting Parties solemly de clare in the names oftheir respective peoples that they 
condenm recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument 
of national policy in their relations with one another." Renunciation o/War as an Instrument o/National 
Policy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact), 27 August 1928,2 Bevans 732, art. 1 (the 15 original signing parties 
included the following States: Germany, the U.S., Belgium, France, the U.K., Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, lreland, lndia, Italy, Japan, Poland and Czechoslovakia). Numerous other States 
later adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, including both China and Russia. "Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928" 
online: The Avalon Project <http:www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlkbpactlkbpact.htm> (accessed 4 July 
2007) .. 
373 J.A.S. Grenville, A History o/the World: From the 20th to the 21st Century (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) at 
195,211 and 238. 
74 
prosecuted for the "crime against peace" (i.e., waging a war of aggression) at the 
Nuremberg Tribunae74 and the International Military Tribunals at Tokyo.375 
Following World War II, the victor nations once again tried to firmly abolish war. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations bans the use of force, or even the threat 
ofusing force in international relations. Specifically, it provides, "[a]ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations." 
2. The Right ofSelf-Defense 
After banning the use of or even the threat of using force, the Charter 
acknowledges that States can legally defendthemselves. Specifically, Article 51 
provides, in pertinent part, "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security." (Emphasis added). 
The U.N. Charter does not give permission for States to use force in self-defense, 
it acknowledges what it calls an "inherent right." The Charter merely recognizes the 
right of self-defense, collective and individual. That said, the Charter qualifies the right 
of self-defense in the very same sentence that recognizes this exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of force or the threat of using force. Self-defense is permitted "if 
374 James Owen, Nuremberg: Evi/ on Trial (London: Headline Review, 2006) at 6. 
375 Brownlie, supra note 313 at 559. 
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an armed attack occurs" and even then, only "until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 
Applying this law to the CUITent subject matter, the general rule is that it is illegal 
to attack another country's satellites with an ASAT. The exception to this general rule 
allows targeting a satellite of an adversary if the attack is pursuant to self-defense or with 
authorization from the Security Council. 
Sorne have argued that "self-defense" is a broad term that includes not only a 
response to armed attack, but also what is known as "preemptive" or "anticipatory" self-
defense.376 The U.S. ho Ids such a view. The National Security Strategy ofthe U.S. 
plainly states, "the United States will, ifnecessary, act preemptively.,,377 Furthermore, 
the U. S. maintains the right of anticipatory self-defense "even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy's attack.,,378 It notes, however, "[t]he United States will 
not use force in al! cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption 
as a pretext for aggression.,,379 The use of the words, "in all cases" highlights the intent 
ofthe U.S. to, in sorne cases, use force to prempt "emerging threats." The U.S. position, 
however, is that anticipatory and preemptive self-defense is in keeping with Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter. "[B]y specifically extending the principles of the U.N. Charter to 
376 "There was no intention at San Francisco to change the existing law, which included anticipatory self-
defence in the face ofimminent attack." Michael C. Wood, "Towards New Circumstances in Which the 
Use of Force May be Authorized? The Cases ofRumanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism, and 
Weapons ofMass Destruction" in Niels BIokker & Nico Schrijver, eds., The Security Council and the Use 
of Force: Theory and Reality-A Needfor Change? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 75 at 80 [emphasis 
added]. 
377 U.S., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White Rouse, Washington, 
September 2002, 15, online: The White Rouse <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (accessed 27 
June 2007). 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
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space, the Outer Space Treaty (Article III) provides for the right of individual and 
collective self-defense, including 'anticipatory self-defense.' ,,380 
With this interpretation, frankly, the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force 
does very little to restrict the use of ASATs. Oddly, defenders of the position that self-
defense includes preemptive or anticipatory attacks frequently refer to the 1837 Caroline 
Case. The Caroline Case dealt with the British destruction ofU.S. ship in U.S. waters 
that was assisting an armed rebellion in Canada.381 In this case, Daniel Webster, then 
Secretary of State, recognized that self-defense could include preemption. But for such 
an attack to truly be self-defense, he noted, "[t]here must be a necessity of self-defence, 
instant,overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. ,,382 
The CUITent U .S. position is far more forward-Ieaning in its application of anticipatory 
self-defense than Mr. Webster' s enunciation of the concept. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that there was nothing anticipatory about the Caroline Case. The ship had 
already been used for transporting men and materials in support of the anti-British 
rebellion in Canada.383 
Judge Schwebel of the International Court of Justice aIso argued that preemptive 
attacks were permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. He noted in his dissent in 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, "1 do not agree with a construction of the 
United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it were worded: 'Nothing in the 
380 U.S., Space Commission Report, supra note 151 at 37. 
381 Caroline Case (1837) 2 Moore 409. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Dinstein, supra note 370 at 184-85. 
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present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if, 
and only if, an armed attack occurs ... ",384 
To read Article 51 in this light, however, would render a major portion of Article 
51 superfluous. It would have been simple enough for the drafters to end the sentence 
after the word "self-defence" ifthat was their intention. Following basic principles of 
treaty interpretation, one cannot focus on the first 15 words of a sentence and then reject 
the final 26 words of the exact same sentence. The words of a treaty must be "interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context [not in disregard of over half of the text] and in light of its object 
and purpose.,,385 Furthermore, no where in Article 51 or elsewhere in the D.N Charter is 
there any indication that self-defense can be exercised in anticipation of an attack. The 
majority ruling in the International Court of Justice's Military and Paramilitary Activities 
Case also ruled against preemptive or anticipatory self-defense. The Court he Id that 
"States do not have a right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute 
384 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986I.C.J. 4 (June 27) at 347 (the actua1 issue in 
the case was not whether self-defense could be "anticipatory" but whether the V.S. was properly exercising 
"collective self-defense." The majority held that the V.S. was not engaged in collective self-defense when 
it conducted military and paramilitary activities in support of the contras against the Nicaraguan 
govemment) [Military and Paramilitary Activities]. 
385 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 V.N.T.S. 331 at 340, art. 31(1). "Since 
the fundamental provisions of the Vienna Convention codify the customary intemationallaw oftreaties, the 
Convention is, in princip le, applicable even for States that have not ratified it." Paul S. Dempsey & 
Michael Milde, International Air Carrier Liability: The Montreal Convention of 1999, (Montreal: McGill 
Vniversity, 2005) at 45. V.S. courts have also quoted the Vienna Convention as binding on them as 
customary intemationa11aw. See Chubb & Son v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 at 304 (2d Ciro 2000), 
cert. denied 533 V:S. 928 (2001). Rence, the Vienna Convention applies to the V.S., as customary 
intemationallaw, even though the V.S. has not ratified it. 
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an 'armed attack. ",386 On the sarne lines, the court noted, "the right of collective self-
defense presupposes that an armed attack has occurred.,,387 
The conclusion of the majority oflegal scholars is that Article 51 does not permit 
preemptive or anticipatory self-defense.388 As Professor lan Brownlie plainly put it, 
"[t]his doctrine lacks a legal basis.,,389 
B. The Laws of Armed ConOict Apply to the Use of ASATs 
Contrary to the adage, "all is fair in love and war," there is a large body of laws 
goveming warfare. Laws goveming warfare are not a new phenomenon; Egypt 
concluded agreements covering the treatment ofprisoners ofwar as early as 1400 B.C. 
and India prohibited the use ofpoisonous weapons as early as 500 B.C.390 The Bible also 
contains laws ofwarfare, notably, "[a]s you approach a town to attack it, you must first 
offer its people terms for peace.,,391 
Modem laws of warfare, now collectively referred to as the Laws of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), stem from a combination of customary intemationallaw, along with 
numerous treaties-most notably, the Hague Conventions of 1907 (limiting the methods 
of warfare) and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (providing protection for victims of 
warfare).392 LOAC limits when aState can wage war, the weapons it may use, the targets 
386 Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 384 at 100. 
387 Ibid. at 110. 
388 Dinstein, supra note 370 at 185. 
389 Brownlie, supra note 313 at 702. 
390 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 151. 
391 Deuteronomy 20: 10 (New Living Translation). 
392 W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds., The Laws ofWar: A Comprehensive Collection of 
Primary Documents of International Laws Governing Armed Conflict (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
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aState may attack and also provides a variety of humanitarian rules to limit unnecessary 
suffering caused by war.393 LOAC is commonly divided into three principles-military 
necessity (only targeting objects that will give a distinct military advantage), 
proportionality (balancing anticipated military advantage against harm caused) and 
chivalry (reducing suffering caused by war). 
1. Applying LOA C ta Outer Space 
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty provides: 
States Parties to the Treaty shaH carry on activities in the exploration and 
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in 
accardance with internatianallaw, including the Charter of the United 
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international cooperation and understanding.394 
Rence, the authors of the Outer Space Treaty reaffirmed the dut y States have to 
comply with existing internationallaw-even in regard to activities in outer space. Not 
only does LOAC apply to activities in space, it applies at aH times-in peace and also 
during times of war. As Professor Ian Brownlie noted in his seminal book on public 
internationallaw: "[m]any treaties, including the Charter of the United Nations, are 
intended to be no less binding in case ofwar, and multipartite law-making agreements 
sùch as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 survive war or armed conflict.,,395 LOAC 
applies in aH places (including space) and at aH times and hence, for present purposes it is 
important to consider the LOAC implications of using ASATs against satellites 
belonging to other nations. 
2. Targeting Civilian Satellites 
393 Detter, supra note 390 at 159. 
394 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. III [emphasis added]. 
395 Brownlie, supra note 313 at 592. 
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Protoco/ lof the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides the basic rule regarding 
protecting civilian "objects" from attack: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shaH at aH times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shaH direct their operations only 
against military objectives.396 
"[C]onstant care" was to be taken to spare "civilian objects.,,397 Civilian 
objects, are defined as "aIl objects which are not military objectives".398 Military 
objectives are then defined as "those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.,,399 
The difficulty with satellites, however, is that almost aIl civilian satellites could be 
used for a military purpose. Michel Bourbonnière, legal counsel for the Canadian Space 
Agency, noted that communications, navigational and remote-sensing satellites could be 
considered as military targets because oftheir use by the military.400 After subtracting 
these satellites from those that might be protected as "civilian objects," there are not 
many remaining. Michel Bourbonnière posited that meteorological satellites would be 
396 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of 
International Armed Conf/icts (ProtocoII), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 48 [ernphasis added] 
[Protocol1]. 
397 Ibid., art. 57(1). 
398 Ibid., art. 52(1). 
399 Ibid., art. 52(2). 
400 Michel Bourbonnière, "National-Security Law in Outer Space: The Interface of Exploration and 
Security" (Winter 2005) 70:1 J. Air L. & Corn. 3 at 50. 
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"more dubious" as a military target than these others,401 but in light of the importance to 
modem militari es of meteorological satellites, as discussed previously, they are arguably 
just as much a military target as the ones Mr. Bourbonnière mentioned. This provision 
may, however, provide sorne limited legal protection to satellites engaged in solely 
scientific research, for example, satellites studying solar physics. 
3. Protection of "Buildings" Dedicated to Science / Historic Monuments 
The Hague Conventions may provide sorne protection to satellites that are 
"dedicated" to science, or that may be regarded as historic monuments. Specifically "[i]n 
sieges and bombardments aIl necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not 
being used at the time for military purposes.,,402 For this Hague Convention provision to 
apply to satellites, a satellite would have to beequated to a "building," as protected by the 
text of the Convention. This comparison is easier to make when you are talking about 
manned space stations, like the Mir or the International Space Station-essentiaIly, 
buildings in space. It is also arguable that the International Space Station has reached the 
status ofbeing a "historie monument" and entitled to protection on that ground as weIl.403 
That said, though the International Space Station is a "permanently inhlibited civil 
401 Ibid. 
402 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 18 October 1907, (1908 
Supp.) 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, art. 27 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [Hague Convention (IV)]. 
403 Cultural property includes "movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage 
of every people .... " Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conjlict, 14 
May 1954,249 U.N.T.S. 215, art. 1(1)(a). 
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international Space Station for peaceful purposes",404 the U.S. has persistently interpreted 
the word "peaceful" as meaning "non-aggressive" as opposed to "non-military." In light 
of the U.S. interpretation of "peaceful," the International Space Station, ifused for 
military purposes (e.g., it's in a great orbit to conduct surveillance), may be a valid 
military target on those grounds. 
4. Use of or Damage to Satellites Belonging to Neutral Powers 
A "neutral" State is any State that is not participating in a conflict as one of the 
belligerent States-it is an "impartial" State.405 The basic principle underlying neutrality 
"requires neutrals not to intervene directly or indirectly in a war and requires belligerents 
to abstàin from involving them.,,406 The territories of "neutral" States are "inviolable," so 
belligerent States cannot attack these territories.407 Though space is not the "territory" of 
any State, but is, rather, "the province of aIl mankind",408 States retainjurisdiction, 
control and ownership over satellites they launch and register. 409 It is reasonable, 
therefore, to consider satellites as part of a State's territory, and hence, the satellites of 
neutral States should not be attacked by belligerents. 
404 1998 IGA, supra note 109, art 1 [emphasis added]. 
405 "The tenu 'neutrality' designates the legal status of aState which does not participate in a war being 
waged by other States." Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (Amsterdam: North-Rolland, 
1982) at 9-10. 
406 Ibid. at 17. 
407 "The territory ofneutral Powers is inviolable." Hague Convention (VJ Respecting the Rights and Duties 
ofNeutral Powers and Persons in Case ofWar on Land, 18 October 1907, 1 Bevans 654, art. 1 [Hague V]. 
408 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. 1. 
409 "A State -party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain 
jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in space or on a celestial 
body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space ... is not affected by their presence in outer space or 
on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. VIII. 
83 
Under the law of neutrality, a neutral State does not have to prevent the export to 
a belligerent "of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use 
to an armyor a fleet.,,410 Meaning, even though it can't aid a belligerent, nothing in the 
basic laws of neutrality requires a neutral State to prevent its citizens from aiding a 
belligerent. There is a significant difference when dealing with space assets, however. 
Under the Outer Space Treaty, aState is responsible for aIl of its space activities-
whether governmental or non-governmental. Specifically, 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities .. , The activities of non-governmental 
entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shaIl 
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State 
Party to the Treaty.411 
Given this provision, it is fair to conclude that under the Outer Space Treaty a 
State is responsible to prevent its citizens and private corporations from using space 
as sets to provide aid to belligerent States. Using this reasoning, U.S. Anny judge 
advocate, Major David Will son, argued, "during armed conflict, the United States may 
legally interfere with a neutral country's commercial satellites (and ground support 
systems) ifthey are supporting enemy operations.,,412 
The USAF also seems to take this positior in its Counterspace Operations 
document: 
Even an adversary without indigenous space assets may use space through 
US, allied, commercial, or consortium space services. These services 
410 Hague V, supra note 407, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
411 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. VI. 
412 David L. Willson, "An Army View ofNeutrality in Space: Legal Options for Space Negation" (2001) 
50 A.F.L. Rev. 175 at 176. 
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include precision navigation, high-resolution imagery, environmental 
monitoring, and satellite communications. Denying adversary access to 
space capability and protecting US and friendly space capability may 
require taking the initiative to preempt or otherwise impede an 
adversary.413 
Contemplated responses include disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying the 
space system.414 
The only questionable part of this policy was the reference to satellite 
communications. Hague (V) specifically permits a neutral State to allow belligerents to 
use communications equipment (whether belonging to the State, companies or private 
individuals). SpecificaIly, it provides, "[a] neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or 
restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of 
wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to Companies or private individuals.,,415 
Applying this to communications satellites, as "other apparatus for the purpose of 
communicating," it appears that a neutral State can legally either allow or prohibit 
belligerent States the use of its communications satellites as long as it treats aIl of the 
belligerent States alike.416 
One possible response to this line of reasoning is to argue that the law of 
neutrality ceased to apply after the creation of the U.N. Charter. The Charter specifically 
provides, "[a]1l Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it 
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to 
413 V.S., Counterspace Operations, supra note 130 at 31. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Hague V, supra note 407, art. 8. 
416 "Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to 
in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents." Ibid., art. 9. 
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any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.,,417 
On its face, this provision seems to negate the existence of any neutral States. 
Another foreseeable problem on the subject of neutrality is that an ASAT attack 
on a satellite belonging to a belligerent may affect the satellites of neutral parties--either 
by the creation of debris that is dangerous to other satellites, or via collateral damage 
(e.g., if a nuclear ASAT were used and a neutral State' s satellites were destroyed by the 
blast's electromagnetic pulse). These effects would be contrary to the obligation of 
holding a neutral State's territory inviolable. The appropriate remedy for the neutral 
State would likely be to seek compensation under the Liability Convention, but recovery, 
as will discussed in the chapter on debris, will depend on proof of fault or negligence. 
Yet anothet potential problem is that many satellites (106 of 847) are 
multinationa1.418 Hence, a satellite could be owned by both a belligerent and a neutral 
party. This is problematic, as the neutral State's territory must be kept inviolable, and yet 
the belligerent State's territory is subject to attack as long as it is making an effective 
contribution to military action and if the attack against this satellite would offer a definite 
military advantage.419 
C. Militarization 1 Weaponization of Outer Space 
The Outer Space Treaty is one of only five treaties that make up the body of space 
law (the other space treaties include the Liability Convention,420 the Registration 
417 Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(5). 
418 DeS Satellite Database, supra note 17. 
419 ProtocolI, supra note 396, art. 52(2). 
420 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 March 1972,961 
D.N.T.S. 187,24 D.S.T. 2389 [Liabi/ity Convention]. 
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Convention,421 the Rescue and Return Agreement,422 and the Moon Treaty423). The Outer 
Space Treaty424 has been variously described as the "Magna Carta," the "Bible" or the 
"constitution" of outer space law. It is most famous for establishing three key principles 
of outer space law. First, it established the "common interest" princip le, providing that 
space shaH be used for the benefit of aIl mankind.425 Second, it established the "freedom 
princip le" which provides that space is free for exploration and use by aIl States.426 
Third, it established the "principle of non-appropriation" which provides that no State can 
claim ownership of any part of outer space-preventing empire building in space.427 
More significantly for the purposes ofthis thesis, however, the Outer Space 
Treaty partiaIly demilitarized space. SpecificaIly, Article IV prevented States from 
placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the 
421 R' . C' 19 eglstratlOn onventlOn, supra note . 
422 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return ofObjects Launched 
into Outer Space, 22 April 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, 19 U.S.T. 7570. 
423 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 December 
1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3. This treaty was never ratified by the U.S., in fact, it has only been ratified by 
twelve States and signed by another four. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, "United Nations 
Treaties and Principles on Space Law," online: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
<http://www.unoosa.orgloosaleniSpaceLaw/treaties.html> (accessed 22 May 2007). 
424 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48. 
425 "The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shaIl be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of aIl countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shaIl be the province of aIl mankind." Ibid., art. I, para. 1. 
426 "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shaIl be free for exploration and use by aIl 
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with intemationallaw, 
and there shaIl be free access to aIl are as of celestial bodies." Ibid., art. l, para. 2. 
427 "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means ofuse or occupation, or by any other means." Ibid., art. II. 
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Earth.428 This does not, however, prevent States from sending a missile equipped with a 
nuclear warhead in transit through space-it only prevents them being placed into orbit (a 
complete revolution around the Earth).429 The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits States 
from installing such weapons on the moon or on other celestial bodies.430 Paragraph IV 
went on to say that the "moon and other celestial bodies shan be used by an States 
exclusively for peaceful pur poses . ,,431 It also forbade the establishment of military bases, 
the testing of any types of weapons or the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial 
bodies.432 It did, however, permit the use ofmilitary personnel for scientific research "or 
for any other peaceful purposes".433 
1. Peaceful Pur poses 
In a letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Chairman of the USSR's 
Council of Ministers in 1958, he wrote: "1 propose that we agree that outer space should 
be used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation to 
this matter ... Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and 
denied to the purposes ofwar? That is my proposal.,,434 
428 "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or 
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." Ibid., art. IV, para. 1. 
429 Cheng, supra note 49 at 410. 
430 Id. 
431 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. IV, para. 2 [emphasis added]. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Nikolai Bulganin (13 January 1958) online: The 
Eisenhower Institute 
<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/letters.htm#letter 1 > 
(accessed 10 July 2007). 
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That same year, the United Nations issued a General Assembly resolution 
entitled, "Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space.,,435 It began loftily, 
"[r]ecognizing the common interest ofmankind in outer space and recognizing that it is 
the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful pur poses only .... ,,436 
This resolution established the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, made up of members from 18 States. A year later, this committee was enlarged to 
24 States and "ad hoc" was removed from its name and it became the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).437 Since that time COPUOS membership has 
grown to 67 States and has two subsidiary bodies, the Legal Subcommittee and the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.438 COPUOS convenes annuaIly and has, from 
the beginning, been devoted to the peaceful uses of outer space. COPUOS is responsible 
for the creation of aIl five space treaties-forming the backbone of space law. 
COPUOS's most important contribution to space law, and the peaceful uses of 
space, was the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty's preamble 
provides, in relevant part, "[ r ]ecognizing the common interest of aIl mankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur poses, [and] Desiring 
to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as weIl as the le gal 
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes .... " 
435 Question of the peaceful use of outer space, GA Res. 1348 (XIII), UN GAOR, 13th Sess., (1958). 
436 Ibid. [emphasis,added). 
437 International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, GA Res. 1472 (XIV), UN GAOR, 14th 
Sess., (1959). 
438 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 20, UN 
Doc. A/61120 (2006) 1 at 2. 
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The Outer Space Treaty also used the phrase, "peaceful purposes" when limiting 
the use of the moon and other celestial bodies: "[t]he moon and other celestial bodies 
shaH be used by aH States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.,,439 
The language the authors chose was nearly identical to the language used in the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty440 which demilitarized Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty provides: 
"Antarctica shaH be used for peaceful purposes only. There shaH be prohibited, inter 
alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type 
ofweapon.,,441 Further, "[t]he present Treaty shaH not prevent the use ofmilitary 
personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.,,442 
The Outer Space Treaty also uses the phrase "peaceful exploration and use" in 
article IX, which provides, in part: 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentiaHy harmful 
interference with the activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, it shaH undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment.443 
439 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. IV(2). 
440 Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959,402 U.N.T.S. 71 [Antarctic Treaty]. 
441 Ibid., art. 1(1) [emphasis added]. The use of the words, "such as" before listing some military activities, 
makes it clear that these are just some examples of State action that are prohibited by the treaty. The 
language used in article IV(2) of the Outer Space Treaty, intentionally or not, does not read like a list of 
examples, but rather an exclusive list of prohibited activities: "The establishment of military bases, 
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres 
on celestial bodies shall be forbidden." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. IV(2). 
442 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 440, art. 1(2). Likewise, the Outer Space Treaty provides, "[t]he use of 
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The 
use ofany equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies 
shaH also not be prohibited." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. IV(2). 
443 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art IX [emphasis added]. 
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President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, 
commented, "we shall urge proposaIs extending the United Nations Charter to the limits 
of man' s exploration in the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting 
weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries 
and benefits of space to every nation.,,444 
At the signing of the Outer Space Treaty on January 27, 1967, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson commented: 
We have never succeeded in freeing our planet from the implements of 
war. But ifwe cannot yet achieve this goal here on earth, we can at least 
keep the virus from spreading. We can keep the ugly and wasteful 
weapons of mass destruction from contaminating space. And that is 
exactly what this treaty does. This treaty means that the moon and our 
sister planets will serve only the purposes ofpeace and not ofwar.445 
Finally, such remarks found their way into the United States Code, which expressly 
provides, "[t]he Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities 
in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.,,446 
All of the above firmly establishes that outer space is to be used for peaceful 
purposes-and only peaceful purposes. In light of the above, it may seem surprising that 
there is considerable debate on whether or not outer space can be used for military 
purposes. The question ofwhat "peaceful purposes" actually me ans has been the subject 
of much controversy from the very beginning of the space age. 
2. Us. position that "peaceful" means "non-aggressive" 
444 U.S., 45 Dept. ofState Bulletin 619 (25 September 1961). 
445 Lyndon B. Johnson, "President Lyndon B. Johnson's Remarks at the Signing of the Treaty on Outer 
Space" (27 January 1967), online: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum 
<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnsonlarchives.hom/speeches.hom/670127.asp> (accessed 5 July 2007). 
446 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (2000). 
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The U.S. has consistently held that the term "peaceful purposes" means "non-
aggressive purposes" (with the possible exception of President Eisenhower). Senator 
Albert Gore, Sr., representing the United States to the United Nations in 1962 asserted: 
It is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for 
peaceful-that is non-aggressive and beneficial-purposes. The question 
of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of 
military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both 
environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete 
disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of 
any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but 
whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other 
obligations oflaw.447 
The U.S.'s 2006 National Spaee Polie y affirms this position: "'peaceful purposes' 
allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests 
,,448 
The U.S. position that "peaceful" use of outer space merely means "non-
aggressive" is also entrenched in CUITent military doctrine. Air Force doctrine says the 
following of "peaceful purposes": 
The [Outer Spaee Treaty] recognizes "the exploration and use of outer 
space for peaceful purposes." The majority of nations have traditionally 
held that the "peaceful purposes" language does not prohibit military 
activities in outer space; such activities have taken place throughout the 
space age without significant international protest. The phase, rather, has 
been interpreted to require that activities in space be non-aggressive, or in 
other words in compliance with the requirements under the United Nations 
Charter and internationallaw to refrain from the threat or use of force, 
except in accordance with the law, such as in self-defense or pursuant to 
United Nations Security Council authorization.449 
3. Position that "peaceful" means "non-military" 
447 UN GAOR, 17th Sess., 1289th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.1IPV.1289 (1962). 
448 V.S., 2006 National Space Policy,.supra note 126 at 1. 
449 V.S., Space Operations, supra note 79 at 27. 
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Taking the other side of the argument, many scholars advocate that "peaceful" 
means "non-military." Hence, they argue that outer space should not be used for any 
military use. 
Professor Bin Cheng, a pioneer of international space law, argued against the V.S. 
interpretation of "peaceful purposes" to mean "non-aggressive" rather than "non-
military." Professor Cheng argued the V.S. position was needless, wrong and potentially 
noxious.450 He believed the V.S. position "needless" as he saw no reason to suggest the 
V.S. intended to conduct military activities on the moon or other celestial bodies.451 
Professor Cheng believed the V.S. position "wrong" becauseaggressive acts were 
already prohibited, not only on the moon and other celestial bodies-but throughout the 
entire universe-pursuant to Article 2(4) ofthe V.N. Charter.452 This being the case, to 
merely parrot that this universal rule aIso applies on the moon and other celestiai bodies 
is nonsensical and adds no value whatsoever to the Outer Space Treaty-hence, 
Professor Cheng argues, "if the word 'peaceful' in Article IV(2) [of the Outer Space 
Treaty] is to have any meaning at aH, it must bear its plain meaning of 'non-military' and 
can certainly not mean non-aggressive. ",453 Professor Cheng found the V.S. 
interpretation of "peaceful" to be "potentiaHy noxious" for fear that this interpretation of 
"peaceful" as "non-aggressive" could influence a like interpretation in other international 
450 Cheng, supra note 49 at 520-22. 
451 This position is referring solely to the requirement of article IV(2) of the Outer Space Tr~aty to use the 
moon and other celestial bodies "exclusively for peaceful purposes." Prof essor Cheng's point neglects to 
consider the other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty calling for the peaceful use of outer space as a 
whole. Ibid. at 520. 
452 Ibid. at 521. 
453 Ibid. 
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agreements requiring "peaceful" usages-for example, the Antarctic Treaty and 
multilateral and bilateral treaties regarding nuclear matters.454 
Professor Ivan Vlasic, noted that "non-military" was the "widely accepted 
interpretation" of "peaceful uses" "prior to and immediately after the advent of the space 
age .... ,,455 He also argued that to define "peaceful" as "non-aggressive" would be 
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word "peaceful." 456 Professor Vlasic 
acknowledged, however, that the early interpretation of "peaceful uses" to mean "non-
military" was quickly "contradicted by the practice of states"-referring to the numerous 
launches ofmilitary satellites by the U.S. and the Soviet Union between the launch of 
Sputnik in October of 1957 and the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in January 
1967.457 It is also relevant to point out that at the time of the signing of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the U.S.'s Program 437 (with its nuclear tipped Thor missiles) was operational-
and it remained operational until1975. The USSR's co-orbital ASAT system was also 
operational at the time of signing the Outer Space Treaty as it tested this satellite from 
1968 unti11982.458 Hence, at the time the Outer Space Treaty was signed (including its 
provisions on the peaceful uses of outer space) both the U.S. and the USSR had military 
satellites and anti-satellite systems. In the end, Prof essor Vlasic was led to conclude, "the 
conclusion is inescapable that aIl military uses of space other than those prohibited by 
treaty were-since the beginning of space exploration and are still today-Iawful as long 
454 Ibid. at 521-22. 
455 Vlasic, Ivan A. "The Legal Aspects ofPeaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" in B. Jasani, 
ed., Peaceful and Non-Peacejùl Uses ofSpace (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991) 37 at 37. 
456 Ibid. at 44-45. 
457 Ibid. at 37. 
458 O'Hanlon, supra note 159 at 10-11. 
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as they do not violate any of the principles and rules of general intemationallaw (e.g., 
uses that represent the threat of or employment of force)." 459 
Other problems with construing "peaceful" to mean "non-military" inc1ude the 
difficulty in determining what constitutes a military activity-are communications a 
military activity? How about navigation, remote-sensing, weather prediction, and 
manned space missions? All of these space activities are widely used by military and 
civilian populations. 
The weaponization of space (i.e., the stationing of weapons in outer space), unlike 
the extensive militarization of space, has not yet taken place. No nation has yet stationed 
a weapon of any kind in outer space. There have, however, been plans for both 
stationing weapons in space 460 and for stationing ballistic missile defense systems in 
space. Though not illegal, the wisdom of pursuing such technology is questionable-
because of its potential to spark an arms race in space,461 provoke a war,462 or simply 
because of such a system's enormous cost. As long as the weapons were neither nuc1ear 
nor otherwise a weapon of mass destruction, such weapons would not be illegal under the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
D. Additional Nonproliferation Efforts in Outer Space 
1. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
459 Vlasic, supra note 455 at 45. 
460 For example, in 2003, the DSAF listed "hypervelocity rod bundles" as a "future system concept" that 
would "provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from space." U.S., 
Transformational Flight Plan, supra note 52 at D-7. 
461 Rob Watson, "China test sparks space arms fears" BBC News (19 January 2007), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/6278867.stm> (accessed Il June 2007). 
462 "In a recent space war game, D.S. commanders found that preemptively destroying or denying an 
opponent's space-based information as sets could lead to rapid escalation into full-sc ale war, even triggering 
nuclear weapon use." DeBlois, supra note 191 at 66. 
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In August of 1963, the V.S., the V.K. and the VSSR signed the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty.463 It has since been ratified by 124 States.464 The purpose ofthis treaty 
is to "achieve the discontinuance of aIl test explosions of nuclear weapons for aIl time 
.... ,,465 Pursuant to its terms, each State "undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to 
carry out anY nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place 
under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer 
space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas .... ,,466 States are still 
permitted by this treaty, however, to conduct nuclear test explosions underground. 
In spite of the language "or any other nuclear explosion," in keeping with the title 
of the treaty, it does not prohibit the use ofnuclear weapons, including nuclear ASATs, in 
war, but oruy the "testing" ofnuc1ear weapons.467 In President John F. Kennedy's letter 
oftransmittal to the Senate, for their "advice and consent," President Kennedy noted, that 
the treaty would "radicaIly limit the testing in which both nations [the V.S. and the 
VSSR] would otherwise engage.,,468 He continued, however, that it would not "outlaw 
the use of nuclear weapons" nor prohibit "aIl nuclear tests" (controIled explosions 
463 Limited Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 150. 
464 "Status of Multilateral Anus Regulation and Disannament Agreements',' online: United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) <http://disannament.un.orgiTreatyStatus.nsf> (accessed 30 May 
2007). 
465 Limited Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 150, preamble. 
466 Ibid., art I(l)(a)[emphasis added). 
467 Cheng, supra note 49 at 527. 
468 U.S., Nuc/ear Test Ban Treaty: Messagefram the President afthe United States Transmitting the Treaty 
Banning Nuc/ear Weapan Tests in the Atmasphere, in Outer Space and Under Water ta the Senate afthe 
United States, 2 I.L.M. 883, 884 (1963). 
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underground in a State's own territory were still pennissible).469 It is also important to 
note that two of the world's nuc1ear powers, China and France, are still not Parties to this 
treaty. 
2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Five years later, another non-proliferation treaty was signed. This treaty, the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, provided that nuc1ear weapon States (the five Nations 
that had manufactured and exploded a nuc1ear weapon prior to 1 January 1967),470 would 
not transfer nuc1ear weapons to any recipient, nor would they encourage or assist a non-
nuc1ear weapon State from seeking to acquire a nuc1ear weapon.471 
The stated purpose of the treaty was to "achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuc1ear anns race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of 
nuc1ear disannament .... ,,472 There are only four States that are not party to this treaty-
India, Pakistan Israel and North Korea-notably, an ofthese States, with the possible 
exception of North Korea, already possess nuc1ear weapons.473 The near universality of 
this treaty, however, has positively limited the number of States capable of exploding a 
nuc1ear device in outer space. 
469 Ibid. 
470 "[A] nuc1ear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuc1ear weapon or other 
nuc1ear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." Treaty on the Nonproliferation ofNuclear Weapons, 1 
July 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, art. IX(3) [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]. 
471 "Each nuc1ear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuc1ear weapons or other nuc1ear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuc1ear weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices." Ibid. art. 1. 
. 472 Ibid., preamble. 
473 "Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements" online: United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf> (accessed 30 May 
2007). 
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3. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 
In 1972, the D.S. and the DSSR signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.474 
Pursuant to this treaty, the D.S. and the DSSR agreed not to deploy anti-ballistic missile 
systems (missiles, launchers and radar systems constructed and deployed for an anti-
ballistic missile rolé75) except for one such system, having a radius of 150 km centered 
around each State's capital,476 and another such system, having the same 150 km radius 
to prote ct the State's intercontinental ballistic missiles.477 Article V ofthis treaty 
specifically prohibited the U.S. and DSSR from developing, testing, or deploying an anti-
ballistic missile system that was "sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based.,,478 
The purpose of this treaty was to curb "the race in strategie offensive arms" and 
decrease "the risk of outbreak ofwar involving nuclear weapons.,,479 By limiting each 
State's defense to nuclear war, the States ensured that any such war would result in the 
utter destruction ofboth States ("mutually assured destruction"). 
Additionally, article XII of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty provided that "[e]ach 
Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical me ans of verification of the 
other Party .... ,,480 This provision has been interpreted as a restriction against interfering 
474 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, supra note 246. 
475 Ibid., art. 11(1). 
476 Ibid., art. III(a). 
477 Ibid., art. III(b). 
478 Ibid., art. V(l) [emphasis added]. 
479 Ibid., preamble. 
480 Ibid., art. XII(2). 
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with another State' s surveillance satellites-the technical means used to verify that each 
State was abiding by its agreement to limit its anti-ballistic missile systems. This 
identical provision is also found in other treaties (e.g., SALT t 81 and SALT It82). 
According to the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both the U.S. and the 
USSR had the "right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraardinary events 
related ta the subject matter afthis Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.,,483 
This agreement was in force between the U.S. and the USSR (and later Russia) for 30 
years. On 13 June 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the treaty, after giving the required 6-
months notice. The White House Press Secretary issued this reasoning supporting the 
U.S. withdrawal: 
Today, the United States and Russia face new threats to their security. 
Principal among these threats are weapons of mass destruction and their 
delivery me ans wielded by terrorists and rogue states. A number of such 
states are acquiring increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles as 
instruments ofblackmail and coercion against the United States and its 
friends and allies.484 
Such reasoning is hardly "related to the subject matter ofthis treaty" and hence, 
the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty was likely against the terms expressly provided for in 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that allowed for withdrawal. Regardless, however, the 
481 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation ofStrategicOffensive Arms, 26 May 1972,944 V.N.T.S. 
13445, art. V(2) [SALT 1]. 
482 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socia/ist Repub/ics on the 
Limitation of Strategie Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common Understandings 
Regarding the Treaty, 18 June 1979, art. XV(2), on1ine: Federation of American Scientists 
<http://www.fas.orginuke/controVsalt2/text/salt2-2.htm> [SALT 11] (this treaty was signed, but never 
ratifie d, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979) (accessed 5 July 2007). 
483 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, supra note 246, art. XV(2) [emphasis added]. 
484 V.S., White House Press Secretary, "ABM Treaty Fact Sheet" (13 December 2001), online: V.S. 
Department ofState <http://www.state.gov/tlac/rls/fs/2001l6848.htm> (accessed 22 May 2007). 
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U.S. withdrew. The main significance ofthis withdrawal was the removal of a legal 
obstacle to the creation of an anti-ballistic missile system. As discussed earlier, any 
BMD system will not only have inherent ASAT capabilities, but, if space-based, will 
provide great incentive to other States to further invest in ASATs. 
This Chapter has analyzed the general illegality ofusing force or even the threat 
ofusing force. It discussed the exception for self-defense. It discussed how LOAC 
applies in outer space, the legality of attacking aU satellites that were lawful military 
objectives (which would likely include almost aU satellites), and also the problem that 
nearlyaU attacks on a belligerent's satellite would likely harm the satellite's belonging to 
neutral States. This Chapter also reviewed the long-fought debate over the militarization 
and weaponization of space and concluded with a review of non-proliferation efforts in 
Space. 
Having covered this wide range of issues aU directly related to the military use of 
ASATs, the next chapter turns to a side effect of ASAT use-space debris-a normal 
consequence of many types of ASATs. If mankind does not find a way to handle this 
problem, aU future use of space is at risk. 
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Chapter Five: Debris 
A. Background Information 
One of the frequently cited problems with ASATs is the creation of debris in 
orbit. There is a lot of debris in outer space, both natural debris (e.g., dust, asteroids, and 
cornets) and as of the last 50 years, man-made debris. Man-made debris inc1udes inactive 
satellites (normally, satellites that have run out of fuel), pieces or components of satellites 
(e.g., rocket bodies and fuel tanks), and fragmentation debris (e.g., pieces of satellites 
destroyed by ASATs, debris from explosions caused by leftover rocket fuel in rocket 
upper stages,485 and also debris caused by rare collisions between satellites). Sometimes 
objects serving no useful purpose whatsoever are released into outer space. For example, 
sorne eccentric individuals have had their cremated human remains released into space.486 
Another eccentric example involves a Canadian company, which in November 2006 paid 
the Russian Space Agency to have one of its astronauts tee-off on a miniature golf baIl 
from the International Space Station.487 Contrary to NASA's predictions that the golf 
485 Half of aIl catalogued debris comes from explosions of space objects-both deliberate explosions 
(including ASATs) and also accidentaI explosions from upper stages and spacecraft batteries. U.S., Office 
of Science and Technology Policy, Interagency Report on Orbital Debris (November 1995) at 2 [U.S., 
Interagency Report]. 
486 South Korea launched Kompsat-l from the United States in 1999. Kompsat-l, though primarily a 
remote-sensing satellite, also released three dozen capsules ofhuman remains. UCS Satellite Database, 
supra note 15. See also Mahulena Hofmann, "Space Cemeteries-A Challenge for the Legal Regime of 
Outer Space" (2001) Proceedings ajthe Forty-third Collaquium an the Law ojOuter Space 380. 
487 Traci Watson, "Golf drive to be measured in miles, not yards" USA Today (16 November 2006), online: 
USA Today <http://www.usatoday.comltech/science/space/2006-11-16-space-goICx.htm> (accessed 18 
June 2007). 
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ball would bum up in the Earth's orbit within three days, the ball is still orbiting the Earth 
(perhaps heading more towards Russia's estimate of a 3.5 year lifespan).488 
USAF Space Command currently tracks over 15,000 space objects.489 Among 
these objects are over 1,000 pieces of debris from China's January 2007 ASAT test.490 
The U.S. cannot track objects smaller than 10 cm (the size of a baseball).491 This being 
the case, an estimated 2 million pieces of debris measuring between 1 mm and 1 cm and 
another 40,000 pieces of debris measuring between 1 cm and 10 cm caused by the 
China's January 2007 ASAT test are not being tracked.492 
ASAT tests by the U.S. and Russia also caused a lot of debris. The USAF's 1985 
ALMV ASAT test against the Solewind P78-1 satellite created 230 pieces of trackable 
debris. This last ofthis debris remained in orbit for 17 years.493 Debris from the January 
'. , 
2007 Chinese ASAT, due to the high altitude at collision, is expected to remain in orbit 
for over 100 years.494 
488 The progress of the golfball is trackable on the website operated by Element 21, the Canadian company 
that sponsored the shot. "Longest Golf Drive in History", online: E21 
<http://www.e21.ca/goICball_tracking>(accessed7July2007).As of7 July 2007, the golfball had 
already traveled over 98 million miles and been in orbit over seven months. 
489 U.S., Chilton Testimony, supra note 80 at 6. 
490 Ibid. at 7. 
491 The U.S. tracks space objects using its Space Surveillance Network (SSN), consisting of25 ground-
based radar and optical sensors operated worldwide. "Space Surveillance," online: United States Space 
Command <http://www.au.af.mil/auJawc/awcgate/usspc-fs/space.htm> (accessed 18 June 2007). 
492 Wright, supra note 6. 
493 Noah Shachtman, "China Space Attack: Unstoppable" The Huffington Post (18 January 2007), online: 
The Huffington Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.comlnoah-shachtmanlchina-space-attack-
unsto _ b _38999 .html> (quoting Theresa Hitchens, analyst for the Center of Defense Information)( accessed 
18 June 2007). 
494 Jessica West, "Fallout from China's anti-satellite test" (Spring 2007) 28:1 The Ploughshares Monitor, 
online: Ploughshares <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monm07a.pdf> (accessed 10 June 
2007). 
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How long a piece of debris will remain in orbit depends on several factors-most 
notably its area, mass and attitude.495 An object less than 600 km from the Earth will 
normaIly faIl back to Earth within a few years.496 At around 800 km, an object will faIl 
within decades.497 "Ab ove 1000 km, orbital debris will normaIly continue circling the 
Earth for a century or more.,,498 An object in Geostationary Earth Orbit will remain in 
orbit for over a million years.499 
The speed of debris also varies depending on its altitude. In general, the closer an 
orbiting object is to Earth, the faster it must be traveling to remain in orbit. In Low Earth 
Orbit, the average speed at collision between any two objects is 10 km/s.500 In contrast, 
objects in Geostationary Earth Orbit are traveling much slower-around 800 mlS.50l 
This debris is conceming on two fronts, both recognized early in space law. First, 
falling debris could cause damage to whatever it hits on the Earth, especially if the falling 
debris is radioactive. 502 Second, while still in space, debris can collide with satellites 
495 V.S., Interagency Report, supra note 485 at 6. 
496 "Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked Questions," online: NASA Orbital Debris Pro gram Office 
<http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#3> (accessed 17 June 2007). 
497 Ibid. 
498 Ibid. 
499 V.S., Interagency Report, supra note 485 at 8. 
500 Mark Williamson, Space: The Fragile Frontier (Reston: AIAA, 2006) at 50. 
501 Ibid. at 51. 
502 For example, a 1972 report prepared for Congress prior to the signing of the Liability Convention 
specifically reported 44 known cases ofspace objects landing on Earth. Two of the objects actually hit 
ships in the oceans. U.S., Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Staff 
Report: Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: Analysis and 
Background Data (Washington, D.C.: Vnited States Governrnent Printing Office, 1972) at 74-75 [V.S., 
Staff Report on Liability Convention]. 
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belonging to other States. To coyer both contingencies, States created the Liability 
Convention of 1972.503 
B. Damages Caused on Earth 
The Liability Convention, one of the five space treaties, provides a framework for 
holding States financially liable for their outer space activities when their activities cause 
damage to another State. The Liability Convention has two separate liability regimes 
depending on where the damage is caused. 
For damage on the Earth, (i.e., caused by falling debris) and for damage to objects 
in flight (i.e., collisions with aircraft) the liability regime provides for absolute liability on 
part ofthe "launching State." Specifically, it provides, "[a] launching State shall be 
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the 
surface of the Earth .... ,,504 Remarkably, the State bears broad responsibility for outer 
space activities "whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by 
non-governmental entities.,,505 Hence, aState is liable for damage caused by the space 
activities of its corporations. 
The Liability Convention does not provide a definition for "absolute hability." 
The Liability Convention expressly provides for several caveats to this "absolute 
liability" ("almost absolute liability" would be more accurate). First, the "damage" that a 
State is hable for is explicitly defined. "The term "damage" means loss oflife, personal 
injury or other impairment ofhealth; or loss of or damage to property of States or of 
503 Liability Convention, supra note 420. 
504 Ibid., art. II. 
505 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. VI. 
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persons, .... "S06 Though one of the very few terms actuaIly defined within a space 
treaty, the definition of "damage" is very problematic. There is much debate on whether 
indirect damages are recoverable. The Staff Report prepared for consideration by the 
V.S. Senate prior to ratification of the Liability Convention noted the vague definition of 
damage "may become one of the major problem are as of the Convention."S07 Noticeably 
absent are damages for lost profits, pain and suffering, and other indirect damages. 
Second, there are explicit exceptions to the "absolute" liability. Article VI provides that 
States will be "exonerated" from absolute liability "to the extent that a launching State 
establishes that the damage has resulted whoIly or partiaIly from gross negligence or 
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State 
or ofnatural or juridical persons it represents."S08 This is a rather odd combination-a 
general regime of liability without regard to fault, where recovery can be somehow 
diminished, or even eliminated, by the fault of the claimant. 
Article VII contains another couple of exemptions to "absolute liability." The 
Convention doesn't apply to damage caused to a State's own nationalss09 or to those 
"participating in the operation ofthat space object" including those that are merely "in 
the immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the result of an 
invitation by that launching State."SlO In light of aIl ofthese caveats on "absolute 
liability," it is more accurate just to note that aState is liable, in accordance with the 
506 Liability Convention, supra note 420, art. I(a). 
507 U.S., Staff Report on Liability Convention, supra note 502 at 23. 
508 Liability Convention, supra note 420, art. VI(1). 
509 Ibid., art. Vn(b). 
510 Ibid. 
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provisions of the Liability Convention, for damages caused on the surface of the Earth or 
to objects in flight. 
By 2002, over 18,000 trackable objects had re-entered the Earth's atmosphere, 
having a total mass of around 27,000 tons.511 During re-entry, the rapid reduction of the 
speed of an object creates so much heat energy that the majority of the objects bum Up.512 
Still, between 10 and 40 percent of the mass of the larger objects might have landed on 
Earth.5B The most tragic re-entry was undoubtedly the breakup of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia on 1 February 2003, which after losing a smaU piece ofits protective foam 
insulation could not withstand the heat ofre-entry.514 A total of 84,000 fragments from 
Columbia were recovered from a 1,000 km by 40 km area of Texas.515 Many other large 
satellites have fallen to the Earth, including the controUed re-entry of the Russian Mir 
space station (having a mass of 135,000 kg and re-entering on 23 March 2001), and the 
uncontroUed re-entry of the D.S. Skylab (having a mass of 74,000 kg and re-entering on 
Il July 1979).516 
The chances ofbeing directly hit by a piece of space debris are almost non-
existent.517 According to the calculations of Heiner Klinkrad, Senior Mission Analyst for 
the European Space Operations Centre, "[t]he annual risk of a person being killed by a re-
511 Reiner Klinkrad, Space Debris: Models and RiskAnalysis (Chichester: Springer, 2006) at 241. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. at 243. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Ibid. 
517 There is, however, one documented case from 1969 when five Japanese sailors aboard a cargo boat were 
injured by falling debris. Cheng, supra note 49 at 287. 
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entering man-made space object isequivalent to the risk ofbeing killed while traveling 1 
meter in a car, doing 10 seconds of skiing, working 1 second as a fire fighter, or spending 
5 minutes ofyour life at the age of60.,,518 
The foregoing analysis shows that the risks associated with being hit by a piece of 
falling space debris are incredibly minuscule. Furthermore, even if sorne falling debris 
caused damage on Earth, the Liability Convention currently provides a me ans for 
recovery from the State whose space object damaged the lives or property of another 
State. 
The real risk offalling debris, however, is when the debris happens to be 
radioactive. A total of 36 space activities between 1965 and 1988 (35 by Russia, 1 by the 
U.S)S19 derived their power from the fission of enriched uranium. Other space missions 
were powered by the heat caused by the natural decay of other radioactive materials (i.e., 
Plutonium, Polonium, Cerium and Strontium).s2o 
The one and only claim in the 35 years since the signing of the Liability 
Convention was made following the uncontrolled landing on the Earth of a nuclear-
powered satellite. On 24 January 1978, the USSR's Cosmos 954 satellite re-entered the 
Earth's atmosphere in Canadian air space. As Canada stated in its claim to the USSR, 
"[0 ln re-entry and disintegration, debris from the satellite was deposited on Canadian 
territory, including portions of the Northwest Territories, Alberta and Saskatchewan."S21 
518 Klinkrad, supra note 511 at 271. 
519 Ibid. at 286. 
520 Ibid. at 285. 
521 Canada's Statement ofClaim, Claim against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage 
Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, dated 23 January 1979, annexed to a note from Mark MacGuigan, Secretary 
of State for External Affairs to Soviet Ambassador Alexander N. Yakovlev, 18 I.L.M. 899 at 902 (1979). 
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Particularly alarming in this case was the fact that Cosmos 954 carried a "nuc1ear reactor 
working on uranium enriched with isotope ofuranium-235.,,522 In total, eleven pieces of 
this satellite were discovered-all but two ofthem were radioactive-some ofthem to a 
lethal degree. 523 Canada estimated its c1eanup costs at nearly $14 million, c1aimed $6 
million524 and settled for $3 million.525 
Following the Cosmos 954 incident, the United Nations passed a General 
Assembly resolution entitled, "Principles Relevant to the Use ofNuc1ear Power Sources 
in Outer Space.,,526 This resolution restricted the use ofnuc1ear power sources in space 
"to those missions which cannot be operated by non-nuc1ear energy sources in a 
reasonable way.,,527 It specifically limited the use ofnuc1ear reactors in space to 
interplanetary missions, high orbits, or Low Earth Orbit "if they are stored in sufficiently 
high orbits after the operational part oftheir mission.,,528 
Despite the General Assembly resolution, nuc1ear power sources in space remain 
a concern. Around 150 kg of the extremely long-lived decaying nuc1ear material (i.e., 
Plutonium, Polonium, Cerium and Strontium) and about 1,000 kg of uranium nuc1ear 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid. at 904 and 922. 
524 The actual figures were $13,970,143.66, $6,041,174.70, and $3,000,000 respectively. Ibid. at 904. 
525 The $3 million dollar settlement was finally negotiated two full years after Canada presented its claim. 
The settlement did not even formally acknowledge the USSR's legalliability. Schwartz, Bryan & Berlin, 
Mark L. "After the Fall: An Analysis of Canadian Legal Claims for Damage Caused by Cosmos 954" 
(1982) 27 McGill L.J. 676, 678. 
526 Principles Relevant to the Use ofNuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, GA Res. 47/68, UN GAOR, 
47th Sess., UN Doc. AIRES/47/68 (1992). 
527 Ibid. at Princip le 3. 
528 Ibid. at Principle 3(2)(a). 
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material is currently in Low Earth Orbit and will remain radioactive long after it has 
fallen back to Earth. 529 
Arguably more significant than the danger debris can cause on Earth is the danger 
debris poses to other space objects. With this in mind, a discussion of the potential for 
debris to damage other space objects is in order. 
C. Damages Caused in Space 
For damages in space, the Liability Convention holds aState liable only ifit was 
at fault for the damage caused. Specifically, aState is liable for such damage "only if the 
damage is due to its fault or the fault ofpersons for whom it is responsible.,,53o Hence, 
recovery under the Liability Convention in cases involving damage in space is much 
more limited than when damage occurs on the Earth. 
The obvious problem with debris remaining in orbit is that, traveling at speeds of 
up to 10 km/s, any collision with a piece of debris larger than 1 cm could destroy a 
satellite. 531 In fact, at 10 km/s, a mere l-gram particle would collide with equal energy as 
a 1-ton car driving approximately 36 km/h.532 This is especially alarming when 
considering manned spacecraft, like the International Space Station or the Space Shuttle. 
The International Space Station, though it is the most heavily shielded spacecraft ever 
flown is only shielded to withstand collisions with debris no larger than 1 cm.533 
529 Klinkrad, supra note 511 at 285. See also Williams on, supra note 500 at 55. 
530 Liability Convention, supra note 420, art. III. 
531 "Objects 1arger than 1 cm can produce catastrophic damage." U.S., Interagency Report, supra note 485 
at 8. 
532 To calculate the kinetic energy at impact is a simple equation: Yz mv2 (where "m" = the mass of the 
object and "v" = the velocity, or speed at which the object is moving). Williams on, supra note 500 at 50. 
533 "Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked Questions," online: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office 
<http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#7> (accessed 18 June 2007). 
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Hopefully it won't ever collide with one of the estimated 40,000 pieces of debris between 
1 cm and 10 cm in size resulting from the 2007 Chinese ASA T test. Prior to the creation 
of this massive amount of new debris, the probability that the International Space Station 
would collide with a piece of debris larger than 1 cm was about 6 percent over the course 
of its estimated 30-year lifespan.534 As more and more debris continues to be created in 
Low Earth Orbit, probabilities for catastrophic collisions will only grow worse. An 
object having a cross sectional area of 100 square meters (including solar panels) and 
orbiting in Low Earth Orbit at 400 km, would hit a piece of debris larger than 10 cm only 
once every 15,000 years.535 
In contrast, the chance for any particular satellite in Geostationary Earth Orbit to 
collide with a piece of debris in any given year is about one in a million.536 That said, 
sorne view the problem of debris in Geostationary Earth Orbit to be even more significant 
than debris in Low Earth Orbit since that debris will remain in orbit for over a million 
years.537 
The risk doesn't sound so intimidating when considering the odds of collision 
with a particular satellite in a particular year. It becomes substantial, however, when you 
consider the probability for a destructive collision among the entire population of active 
534 Thomas Beer, "The Specific Risks Associated with Collisions in Outer Space and the Retum to Earth of 
Space Objects-the Legal Perspective" (2000) XXV Air & Space L. 42 at 44. 
535 "Space Debris: accessing the risk" (16 March 2005), online: European Space Agency 
<http://www.esa.intiesaCP/SEMZLOP256E]eatureWeek_0.html> (accessed 20 June 2007). 
536 Williams on, supra note 500 at 51. 
537 "[T]he orbiting objects in [Geostationary Earth Orbit] will remain there for tens of millions ofyears, Le., 
for ever. Thus, they pose a threat to space operations in that orbit." Ram Jakhu, "Space Debris in the 
Geostationary Orbit: Implications for Commercial Space Activities" (Paper presented to the Second Space 
Law and Policy Symposium, Tokyo, Japan, 26 February 1991). 
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satellites. "If you calculate the combined profile area of aU satellites in orbit, you find 
that the average time between destructive collisions is about 10 years.,,538 
One famous collision was between the D.S. Space Shuttle and a fleck ofpaint 
smaller than .01 cm. The paint chip seriously damaged the window of the Space 
Shuttle.539 This tiny collision was not, however, a one time occurrence. In the first 70 
flights of the Space Shuttle, the window had to be replaced 60 times due to high-speed 
impacts with objects the size of a grain of salt (sub-millimeter).540 The risk to the Space 
Shuttle from critical penetration by space debris has been calculated at "about 1 in 250 
for a typical mission to the International Space Station, which makes orbital debris the 
single large st threat to Shuttle operations from launch to landing.,,541 
Another frequently cited example of damage caused by space debris is damage to 
the Hubble Space Telescope. In 1993, during the first servicing mission to the Hubble 
Space Telescope, a hole measuring over 1 cm was found through an antenna mounted to 
the telescope.542 A solar array returned from the Hubble Space Telescope, after three and 
a half years in space revealed an astounding 150 complete penetrations.543 
538 "Space Debris: accessing the risk" (16 March 2005), online: European Space Agency 
<http://www.esa.intiesaCP/SEMZLOP256E ]eature Week _ O.html> (quoting Reiner Klinkrad, Senior 
Mission Analyst for the European Space Operations Centre)(accessed 20 June 2007). 
539 "Calculations showed that a O.2-mm paint fleck, traveling at a relative velocity ofbetween 3 and 6 km/s, 
produced the 4-mm-diam crater." Williams on, supra note 500 at 64. 
540 U.S., Interagency Report, supra note 485 at 24. 
541 Williams on, supra note 500 at 64. 
542 "Space Debris: accessing the risk" (16 March 2005), online: European Space Agency 
<http://www.esa.intiesaCP/SEMZLOP256E]eatureWeek_ O.html> (accessed 20 June 2007). 
543 Williamson, supra note 500 at 61. 
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In July 1996, the French microsatellite Cerise was hit by a piece of debris from an 
Ariane rocket's third stage (a French rocket) that had exploded 10 years earlier.544 The 
debris from the Ariane completely severed the satellite's gravit y stabilization boom, 
though, remarkably, the satellite continued to function. 545 This was the first time two 
catalogued pieces of debris had ever hit each other. 546 
The debris problem is real. Satellites do get impacted by man-made debris. One 
expert estimates that aIl satellites get hit by tiny pieces of debris every day.547 Applying 
the Liability Convention to a case involving the destruction of a satellite in space is 
doubtful. First, unless the collision happens to be between two catalogued space objects, 
it is doubtful that the injured party would be able to attribute the offending debris to any 
particular State. Anything larger than 1 cm is large enough to destroy today' s most 
heavily protected spacecraft-the International Space Station.548 Most debris that is large 
enough to destroy a satellite is too small for even the best oftoday's equipment to track 
(smaller than 10 cm). AState might not even know why its satellite ceased 
functioning-it may be uncertain whether its satellite was hit by a pie ce of debris or 
whether it had sorne type of internaI malfunction. Hence, proving that a particular State 
caused damage to another State's satellite is unlikely. Second, even if the debris were 
attributed to a State, in order to recover damages for the loss of a satellite, it would have 
544 Ibid. at 66. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Ibid. at 67. 
547 Ibid. at 66. 
548 "Orbital Debris: Frequently Asked Questions," online: NASA Orbital Depris Program Office 
<http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#7> (accessed 18 June 2007). 
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to prove fault (negligence) of the State whose debris struck its satellite.549 Because of 
these difficulties, any recovery via the Liability Convention for damages caused to a 
State's space objects is unlikely. 
D. Due Regard and Appropriate International Consultations 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides, in relevant part: 
In the exploration and use of outer space, ... States Parties to this Treaty ... 
shal! conduct al! their activities in outer spaçe, ... with due regard to the 
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.... If a 
State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, ... would cause 
potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States Parties 
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, it shal! undertake appropriate international 
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. 550 
This article applies to ASAT use in two respects. First, all States are bound to 
conduct "all oftheir activities in outer space" (including ASAT tests) with "due regard" 
for the interests of all other States that are Party to this treaty. What constitutes "due 
regard" is not defined in the Outer Space Treaty. It is a phrase that has common 
meaning, however. "Due" generally means "[j]ust, proper, regular, and reasonable".551 
"Regard" generally means "[a]ttention, care, or consideration".552 It is hard to imagine 
how in most cases, conducting an ASAT test th"at caused considerable debris could 
possibly be done with "due regard" for anyone but one's own State. 
Furthermore, it is clear that "appropriate international consultations" are required 
before aState does something that "would cause potentially harmful interference" with 
549 Liability Convention, supra note 420, art. IV(1)(b). 
550 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 48, art. IX [emphasis added]. 
551 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. "due". 
552 Ibid., S.v. "regard". 
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the activities of other States. Due to the large amount of debris that is created in space 
when sorne ASATs are employed, it is likely that the above provision of the Outer Space 
Treaty will apply. The word "harmful," is not defined in the Outer Space Treaty. This is 
unfortunate, but consistent with the wide range of other terms used in the Outer Space 
Treaty that were never defined.553 That said, when an ASAT creates an estimated 40,000 
pieces of debris large enough to destroy spacecraft-that will be whizzing around in orbit 
for around 100 years-the only reasonable conclusion is that this will cause "potentiaUy 
harmful interference" with the satellites (current and future) that share this orbit. 
International consultations are therefore required before ASAT tests like the one 
conducted by China in January 2007. 
The requirement for consultations would not, itself, prohibit any ASAT tests, 
regardless of how much debris the test would cause. During "appropriate international 
consultations," however, States would have the opportunity to express how a planned 
activity would not show them the "due regard" they are owed. Due regard, should not be 
considered as having been satisfied merely because aState has conducted the 
"consultations. " 
Most recently, China neither showed "due regard" to aU of the other States 
operating satellites in Low Earth Orbit, nor did China engage in any international 
consultations whatsoever prior to launching their J anuary 2007 ASA T test. Hence, China 
violated both ofthese requirements of article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. 
553 Other terms used in the Outer Space Treaty that lack definitions (and have caused considerable 
consternation to space lawyers) include the terms: "space," "peaceful," "weapons ofmass destruction," 
"use," "astronauts," "international responsibility," "authorization and continuing supervision," "component 
parts," "launches," "procures," "cooperation," "appropriate measures," and "appropriate international 
consultations. " 
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E. Environmental Modification Convention 
The Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)554 also arguably applies 
to ASA T weapons. It prohibits States from engaging "in military or any other hostile use 
of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party.,,555 
ENMOD specificaIly notes "'environmental modification techniques' refers to any 
technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the earth ... or of outer space."S56 
One kinetic-energy ASAT can cause thousands of pieces of debris that can remain 
in orbit for long periods of time-decades in Low Earth Orbit, basicaIly "forever" if such 
an ASAT were ever used on a satellite in Geostationary Earth Orbit. Arguably, since the 
signing of ENMOD in 1977, the V.S., Russia, and most recently, China, have all violated 
the terms of ENMOD. AlI ofthese States have used military techniques that cause 
"widespread, long-lasting" effects to the space environment. 
To SUffi up this Chapter, debris in space cornes from a variety of sources. ASA T 
use, notably the use of kinetic-energy ASATs, creates a large amount of this debris. The 
amount of debris in orbit is growing. Debris travels so fast that even pieces no larger 
than a pea can destroy spacecraft, and at times, larger pieces faIl back to Earth, putting 
554 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques, 18 May 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [ENMOD]. This treaty entered into force on 5 October 1978 
and has been ratified by 72 States (notab1y including the U.S., China, Russia, the U.K., and North Korea). 
Notably, France and Iran are not party to ENMOD. "Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary-General," online: United Nations Treaty Collection online: United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://untreaty . un.orglEN G LISHlbib lei englishinternetbible/partll chapterXXVl/treaty 1.asp> (accessed 24 
May 2007). 
555 ENMOD, supra note 554, art. 1(1). 
556 Ibid., art. II [emphasisadded]. 
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objects on Earth at risk. The Liability Convention was created to address the issue of 
damage caused by space objects. While it has been invoked on only one occasion, the 
likelihood of damage caused by debris is growing. Two other treaties also have 
provisions relating to creation of debris-the Outer Space Treaty and ENMOD. 
Pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty, States should avoid unnecessarily creating 
debris out of "due regard" for the outer space activities of other States. States are also 
required to conduct "appropriate international consultations" prior to activities in space 
that will "potentially" cause harmful interference with the activities of other States. 
Creating large amounts of dangerous debris should qualify as such potentially harmful 
interference. Finally, the provisions of ENMOD also apply to outer space activities. 
ENMOD prohibits States from using military techniques in ways that will have "long-
lasting or severe effeçts" on the environment. ASA T use creates such damaging and 
long-lasting effects in outer space. 
The concern with space debris is serious. Were States to employ debris-creating 
ASATs in a conflict, a consequence would certainly be a dramatically more hazardous 
and less useable environment in space. This danger, combined with the concerns over 
turning space into a battlefield, lead to the final discussion-the desirability of restricting 
ASAT use via an international treaty. 
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Chapter Six: A Treaty Banning ASATs 
A. Desirability of a Treaty Restricting ASATs 
The values ofASATs are rather straightforward. If aState can negate an 
adversary's space capabilities (communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and even 
weather), while maintaining its own space capabilities, it will have a significant military 
advantage. On the flip-side, if aState is facing an enemy with a significant military 
advantage due to its opponent's space assets, use of ASATs would decrease this 
advantage, as previously noted, in "a non-linear degradation-one approaching an order 
of magnitude reduction in capability.,,557 ASATs could also act as a deterrence to war-
as uncertainty over the ability to effectively employ military satellites against a potential 
enemy may factor into a decision on whether or not to go to war.558 
The problems of ASATs are equally straightforward. First, States want to ensure 
vulnerable and increasingly valuable (militarily, economically and even socially) space 
as sets are safe (from direct attack and also from indirect damage). Second, sorne 
satellites serve important conflict prevention purposes (e.g., early warning satellites and 
those used for arm control verification). Continued access by both sides of a potential 
conflict to these satellites serves to preserve peace, or at least avoid escalation to a 
nuclear conflict. 
Hence, on the one hand, aState wants to be able to threaten a potential opponent' s 
satellites (especially those that will seriously enable the opponent's military) and on the 
other hand, it would be advantageous to have assurances that potential enemies would not 
557 Shields, supra note 256 at 6. 
558 V.S., Policy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 16. 
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attack your own satellites--even though they provide incredible advantages in any 
conflict. LogicalIy, the exchanged promise, "1 won't hurt your space assets ifyou won't 
hurt mine" would most favor the States with the most space assets. Rence, it would seem 
logical that the US. would be extremely interested in this sort of an agreement 
(especialIY ifthere were measures in place to ensure compliance). A potential problem 
requiring consideration, however, is that any BMD plan that includes attacking missiles 
while transiting space would also have inherent ASA T capabilities. If a BMD program is 
perceived as vital to a State's security, then any agreement restricting ASATs may have 
to specifically allow for the BMD program. 
It cornes down to a judgment calI over which is most important to aState: 
a. The ability to destroy the satellites of enemies (in self-defense); or 
b. Keeping space assets free from attack (assuming enemies also obey the law). 
Of course, having an agreement won't necessarily prevent aState from attacking 
another State' s satellites. But if proper verification measures559 are employed, States can 
have sorne confidence that its space as sets will be safe. Problems with verification have, 
in fact, been largely responsible for past failures to reach ASA T arms control 
agreements.560 Ifthis continues to be an irreconcilable problem, one solution would be to 
merely ban whatever ASATs can be verified. 561 
President Reagan's policy on ASAT arms control correctly observed, "possible 
limits or bans on anti-satellite (ASAT) arms must be judged not only in their ability to 
559 E.g., one space law expert posited, "by far the most effective and most reliable [verification measures] 
would be on-site, pre-Iaunch inspections of aIl objects, both civilian as weIl as military, destined for outer 
space." Vlasic, supra note 455 at 52. 
560 V.S., PoUcy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 22-23. 
561 Carter, supra note 240 at 96. 
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limit damage to space objects, but also in their contribution to achieving the basic 
objectives of arms control with respect to terrestrial conventional and nuclear conflict."S62 
With this in mind, States need to determine whether ASATs, or systems with 
ASAT capabilities (e.g., space-based BMD), will prevent or provoke conflict. States 
must balance whether ASATs make their satellites safer or, on the contrary, more 
vulnerable. The V.S., through its partially-space-based BMD pro gram, would like to 
change its position from "mutually assured destruction" to "assured survival."S63 The 
BMD pro gram, with its ASAT capabilities, besides being incredibly expensive,S64 has 
only dubious chances at success.S6S Given this, the V.S. will have to determine whether it 
is worth initiating a possible nuclear confrontation with Russia or China in order to field 
a BMD system in space. 
In light of Russian President Vladimir Putin's warning of "nothing less than the 
beginning of a nuclear era"S66 it appears that new space-based weapons (including, 
perhaps, sorne aspects ofBMD) could instigate, rather than prevent the escalation of 
hostilities-up to and including nuclear war. This is not something to glibly ignore. 
562 V.S., Policy on ASAT Arms Control, supra note 213 at 17. 
563 Graham, supra note 243 at 103. 
564 The anticipated cost of a space-based BMD is estimated at $16.4 billion. Independent W orking Group, 
supra note 134 at 107. 
565 Fred Kaplan, "Shooting Down Missile Defense: Even the Pentagon Admits the Program is in Trouble", 
online: (7 August 2003) Slate Magazine <http://www.slate.comlid/2086724> (accessed 5 July 2007). 
566 Statement of Russian Ambassador on PAROS, supra note 361 (quoting President Vladimir Putin). 
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B. The Prospects for the Treaty 
The prospects are grim for any new international agreement limiting ASATs. The 
U.S. (at least the Executive Branch) is against creating any new international agreements 
relating to space law. The 2006 National Space Policy is explicit on this matter: 
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or 
other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of 
space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair 
the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, 
and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests .... 567 
This position was affirmed by U.S. Ambassador Rocca at the Conference on 
Disarmament in February 2007, "[d]espite this long-standing and effective international 
space treaty regime, centered on the Outer Space Treaty, there are those who advocate 
negotiating new multilateral agreements that we believe to be unnecessary and 
counterproductive. We do not need to enter into new agreements.,,568 
Combined with the 2002 withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
and the U.S. pursuit of a ballistic missile defense system, the prospects for a treaty 
restricting ASA Ts look grim. That said, the actual weaponization of space has not yet 
begun. As such, it is not too late to return to the negotiating tables and seek to work out 
an agreement that would be satisfactory to aIl parties. 
567 D.S., 2006 National Space Policy, supra note 126 at 2. 
568 "Statement of Ambassador Rocca on PAROS", supra note 316 at 4. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Space assets are increasingly valuable. Satellites make military forces vastly 
more effective than ever before. Satellites are also commercially successful-currently a 
$200 billion dollar industry and still growing. ASAT weapons are the natural enemies of 
aIl satellites. ASATs come in the form of nuclear weapons, kinetic-energy weapons, 
direct-energy weapons and electronic jamming weapons. They also include BMD 
programs, which have inherent ASAT capabilities. A growing number of States have 
ASAT capabilitieg and sorne ASAT capability could effectively be employed by 
terrorists. While sorne measures may be employed to increase the "survivability" of 
satellites-such as hardening, maneuvering out of the way of incoming satellites, or using 
"stealth" capabilities-these measures cannot adequately protect satellites from the wide 
variety of ASA T threats. 
The V.S., China and Russia have aU demonstrated their intentions to use ASAT 
weapons. The V.S. has done so via its published military doctrine, its national space 
policy and its continued funding for "space control" and BMD. The V.S. withdrawal 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and its vote against the PAROS resolution 
also bode ill for the future of ASAT arms control. China and Russia, though less 
transparent, and in fact, publicly opposed to ASA Ts, have both demonstrated sorne intent 
to use them. China has demonstrated this most recently by its recent laser and kinetic-
energy ASAT tests. Chinese military doctrine also discusses the use of ASATs in any 
conflict over Taiwan. Russia, though still observing its moratorium on ASAT use, retains 
its ASAT capability and has publicly threatened nothing less than nuclear war in the 
event the V.S. proceeds with space-based weapons. 
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Though the UN Charter currently bans the use of force, or even the threat of 
force, the exception for self-defense has been broadly interpreted by the U.S. LOAC 
applies to any conflict in outer space. Vnder LOAC, most satellites, even commercial 
ones, will be considered valid military objectives. One LOAC problem will be the 
difficulty of avoiding indirect damage to the satellites of neutral States when attacking 
the satellites of a belligerent. In spite of loft y statements regarding preserving space from 
war, space is already heavily militarized and willlikely be weaponized as soon as the 
V.S. begins its space-based BMD. This weaponization willlikely spark not merely a 
space-race but a war. Several treaties contain provisions relating to arms control in 
space. In 2002, however, the V.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was 
a setback to the goal ofkeeping space free from weaponization. 
, 
Another substantial concern with ASA T use is the enormous amount of debris 
many ASATs generate. This debris, in turn, threatens the future use of space for 
centuries. The Liability Convention provides for financial recovery for States who suffer 
damage caused by space objects (inc1uding debris). Perhaps more significantly, the 
Outer Space Treaty requires States to conduct their activities in space with "due regard" 
for the space activities of other States-this requirement should prevent States from 
unnecessarily exploding ASATs. Provisions mandating "appropriate international 
consultations" should provide States the opportunity to express how planned ASAT tests 
would not show proper "due regard" for their space activities. Finally, the ENMOD 
treaty also has provisions which should be read as prohibiting the use of many types of 
ASATs. 
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A treaty restricting ASAT use would provide protection for satellites and preserve 
the use of space for future generations. Prior attempts at negotiating such a treaty have 
been unsuccessful. The Executive Branch ofthe V.S. has expressed a totallack of 
interest in trying to come to an agreement limiting ASATs. 
Has the V.S. lost faith in the ability of laws to help maintain peace? Would the 
V.S. rather rely solely on its military might to combat threats to both the V.S. aI1d its 
space assets? Ifso, Thomas Paine's famous quote, "in America THE LAW IS KING"s69 
is in danger ofbecoming merely "America IS KING." It is not too late, however, to 
return to the table of diplomacy. Like all international agreements, creating an ASAT 
treaty will require sorne give and take. In so doing, we will preserve the future of 
space-and perhaps more. 
569 Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Edinburgh, 1776) at 55 (emphasis in original). 
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